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Abstract 
 
Contrary to the prevailing view that drones spare civilian lives, this paper 
argues that drones actually place more civilians at risk. The reason is simple: 
drones are used outside areas of active hostilities in civilian populated areas where 
no other weapon could be used. The oft-repeated mantra that drones are more 
precise and less destructive and therefore spare more civilian lives rests on a false 
comparison. Many commentators wrongly assume that if we were not using 
drones, we would be using some less precise and more destructive alternative, 
such as cruise missiles. Apart from the difficulties in deploying cruise missiles 
covertly and their inability to strike with drone accuracy, cruise missile strikes in 
civilian populated areas would almost certainly violate the laws of distinction and 
proportionality and, even if technically legal, would be politically unpalatable. 
Drones thus put lethal force on the table where it would otherwise be absent and 
they highlight the lack of law designed to regulate their use. Because the law of 
armed conflict was developed for active war zones, it is inadequate to govern 
drone strikes in areas away from active hostilities. As a result, the laws of 
distinction and proportionality, which govern the use of lethal military force, must 
be reformulated for drone strikes. Rather than focusing solely on the 
commander’s intent to target enemy combatants, distinction should require a 
functional analysis of the geographic area to be destroyed by a strike—the death 
zone. Where the death zone by its nature, location, purpose or use is substantially 
a civilian object, such as an outdoor market or a civilian apartment building, the 
death zone as a whole should be deemed a civilian object, regardless of the 
presence of an otherwise valid military objective, such as an enemy militant. Once 
a target satisfies distinction, our assessment of proportionality should take into 
account not only the civilian casualties likely to result from the strike, but also the 
strategic costs and negative secondary effects of deploying aerial strikes in 
civilian areas. 
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Introduction 
 
 The most important legal implications of drone technology have yet to be 
recognized. Drones are legally interesting not because they are remote-controlled 
or risk-free, but because they have enabled a covert war and air strikes against 
combatants who are virtually indistinguishable from civilians.1 While both the 
covert use of drones and strikes in civilian areas have been lamented, 
commentators have either missed or denied the central role that drone technology 
has played. The fundamental change that drone technology has brought to war 
and counterterrorism requires us to rethink the law governing the use of force 
outside active war zones. The law of armed conflict (LOAC), which was designed 
for active war zones, is inadequate to govern drone strikes in areas away from 
active hostilities.2 As a result, this Article argues that the laws of distinction and 
proportionality need to be reformulated for drone strikes. Instead of focusing 
simply on the identity of civilians and combatants, distinction and proportionality 
should turn on the civilian or military character of the area to be destroyed by an 
attack. Doing so will both better accord with the protected status of civilians3 and 
offer greater flexibility than the rules of engagement developed by the Obama 
administration. While the Obama Administration took tentative steps to address 
the legal challenges posed by drones through Presidential Policy Guidance and 
Executive Orders,4 durable legal obligations, rather than mere policy, are needed. 
Far from relaxing or eliminating the more restrictive rules of engagement for 
                                                
1 Throughout this Article, “drones” refers to the Predator and Reaper drones that have been used 
by the U.S. for targeted killing. 
2 The Supreme Court recognized in Hamdi that different “practical circumstances” of warfare may 
require a revision of the rules governing detention. This Article makes the same argument with 
respect to the rules governing the use of lethal military force. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 521 (2004) (“[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and 
appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and 
our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of 
a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law 
of war, that understanding may unravel.”). 
3 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 51(1) 1125 
U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (“The civilian population and individual civilians 
shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations.”). 
4 A redacted version of the Presidential Policy Guidance, Procedures for Approving Direct Action 
Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas Of Active Hostilities, was 
recently released as a result of a lawsuit by the ACLU, see Am. Civil Liberties Union, Targeted 
Killing FOIA Database: Presidential Policy Guidance (document dated May 22, 2013; release date 
Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/foia-document/presidential-policy-guidance. An abbreviated 
version was previously released under the heading, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and 
Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and 
Areas of Active Hostilities [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (May 23, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-
procedures-use-force-counterterrorism. See also Executive Order 13732, United States Policy on 
Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the 
Use of Force (July 1, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-
order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures. 
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strikes outside active war zones, as the Trump Administration has suggested,5 the 
U.S. should articulate and affirm appropriate legal obligations bearing on such 
strikes. Doing so would enable the U.S. to meet the legal challenges posed by 
drones and take the lead in constructing the legal architecture applicable to drones 
for the future. 
 
 While government officials and scholars have lauded drones for their 
humanitarian virtues,6 using drones actually places more civilians at risk. The 
reason for this is very simple. The oft-repeated mantra that drones are more 
precise, less destructive, and therefore spare more civilian lives rests on a false 
comparison. Many commentators wrongly assume that if the United States were 
not using drones, it would be using some less precise and more destructive 
alternative, such as cruise missiles. Apart from the difficulties in deploying cruise 
missiles covertly and their inability to strike with drone accuracy, cruise missile 
strikes in civilian populated areas would almost certainly violate the laws of 
distinction and proportionality and, even if technically legal, would be politically 
unpalatable. Drones have thus filled a void where no other weapon would be 
used. Drones change the alternative space of deploying lethal military force, 
putting aerial strikes and attendant civilian harm on the table where they would 
otherwise be absent. 
 
 Part I begins by showing how drone technology has eroded democratic 
accountability and expanded the use of lethal military force. Because drones pose 
no risk of American casualties, require no massive troop deployment, and enable 
high precision targeting with relatively narrow blast radii, they are the perfect 
weapon for covert counterterrorism operations. The extraordinary ability to use 
drones covertly has enabled the government’s use of lethal military force to 
proceed virtually unchecked. The ability to kill secretly with drones raises 
fundamental questions of legal accountability, legitimacy, and oversight in a 
country structured by separation of powers and democratic self-government. 
 
 Although lack of oversight over the use of lethal force is problematic 
enough in a democracy, the greatest legal challenges posed by drones arise 
because they are being used where no other weapon could be. Drones can only be 
used in radically asymmetric contexts with the fighting advantage firmly on their 
side. Given the technological disparity between drones and those targeted by 
them, reason dictates that such forces cannot and will not distinguish themselves 
                                                
5 See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen 
Counterterrorism Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html (“The 
Trump administration is exploring how to dismantle or bypass Obama-era constraints intended to 
prevent civilian deaths from drone attacks, commando raids and other counterterrorism missions 
outside conventional war zones like Afghanistan and Iraq . . . .”). 
6 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-President-national-defense-
university (“Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely to 
cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage.”). 
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from civilians. Because drones allow more precise and lower impact targeting 
than other unmanned weapons, they have enabled the targeting of individual 
enemy combatants in civilian populated areas to become a policy norm for the 
first time.  
 
Having shown how drones raise unique legal issues related to the use of 
military force and democratic accountability, I briefly review the most prominent 
defenses and criticisms of drones. A common failing of both is that they do not 
adequately engage the unique characteristics of drone technology and the limited 
circumstances in which drones can be used. As a result, drone defenders are led to 
believe that drones are simply one weapon among many interchangeable 
alternatives, and critics level charges against drones that are both dubious in their 
own right and equally true of older weapons long in use. 
 
 Part I concludes by testing the thesis that drones put more civilians at risk 
by comparing recent rates of civilian deaths with drones to rates of civilian deaths 
with manned aircraft. Although manned aircraft lack the surveillance capability of 
drones and thus should be expected to result in less accurate targeting, a direct 
comparison shows that civilian death rates from drone attacks fall within the same 
range of civilian death rates in NATO’s manned intervention in Kosovo. This is 
true despite the fact that the Kosovo campaign was criticized for higher death 
rates because NATO assumed a “zero casualty” policy with respect to its own 
sorties.7 The argument that drones are more precise, less destructive, and therefore 
spare more civilians turns out to be false not only on its own terms, but also when 
compared to other aerial attacks. 
 
 Given the unprecedented use of lethal force in civilian populated areas 
introduced by drones, Part II examines the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) 
developed by the Obama Administration to govern their use. The special 
challenges posed by drones are apparent in the PPG. The PPG recognizes that a 
LOAC framework is required to authorize lethal force against terrorists who are 
not posing an immediate threat of serious bodily harm. However, the PPG 
restricts the LOAC framework with law enforcement principles, such as the 
requirement that no civilians be killed or injured by drone strikes. Despite its 
attempt to respond to the unique legal issues posed by drones, the PPG ultimately 
fails legally because neither the law enforcement nor the LOAC framework was 
developed for the use of lethal military force outside areas of active hostilities. 
The PPG also fails on policy grounds because, by declining to articulate and avow 
the legal obligations bearing on drone strikes in areas away from active combat, 
the Obama Administration squandered a critical opportunity to contribute to the 
                                                
7 Human Rights Watch reported that “there is a question as to whether NATO’s extraordinary 
efforts to avoid casualties among its pilots precluded low-flying operations that might have helped 
to identify targets more accurately. . . . In the case of attacks such as those at Djakovica-Decane, in 
which flying at a higher altitude seems to have impeded a pilot from adequately identifying a 
target, the conclusion again is that inadequate precautions were taken to avoid civilian casualties.” 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm (last visited May 15, 2017). 
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formation of customary international law that would govern drones going 
forward.8 Rather than making ad hoc policy restrictions on the use of force or 
loosening those restrictions,9 the U.S. should reformulate distinction and 
proportionality for drone strikes away from active hostilities and explicitly avow 
those reformulations as legal obligations bearing on U.S. military operations. 
 
 Part III argues that the legal baselines established by the laws of 
distinction and proportionality need to be reformulated for three central reasons. 
First, the LOAC specifically grants civilian populations protection from attack, 
even when enemy combatants are present among them.10 Second, the LOAC was 
developed for areas of active hostilities where civilians were presumed to be on 
notice of the dangers accompanying armed conflict and generally distinguishable 
from enemy combatants. Third, the LOAC does not adequately account for the 
strategic costs and negative secondary effects of aerial strikes in civilian areas, 
and thus fails to yield an accurate account of the military advantage of a strike 
because overly focused on short-term gains. As a result, when the laws of 
distinction and proportionality are applied to strikes outside active combat areas, 
they are insufficient both to protect civilians and to serve our military advantage. 
 
 Part IV articulates how distinction and proportionality need to be 
reformulated for drone strikes outside active combat areas. Distinction is 
understood to require only commander intent to target a legitimate military 
objective. On that understanding, distinction is satisfied if a commander intends to 
target a single enemy combatant in a crowded marketplace populated by civilians. 
When civilians and combatants are intermixed, as they often are in areas away 
from active hostilities, a focus on commander intent will do little or nothing to 
protect civilians from the harms of war. In such areas, rather than focusing solely 
on the commander’s intent to target enemy combatants, distinction should require 
a functional analysis of the geographic area to be destroyed by a strike—the death 
zone. Where the death zone contains an object that is substantially civilian by its 
                                                
8 The difference between domestic policy regulations—as enshrined in Executive Orders and 
Presidential Policy Guidance—and statements of legal obligations under international law is 
crucial to the United States’ ability to contribute to the customary international law governing 
drones going forward. In order to contribute to customary international law, a state must not only 
exhibit consistent practice, but also do so out of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. See, 
e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (defining customary international 
law as “practice accepted as law.”). However, both Executive Order 13732 and the PPG 
emphasize that they are only policy. Executive Order 13732 also explicitly states that “[t]he 
policies set forth in this order are . . . not intended to create new international legal obligations.” 
Executive Order 13732, supra note 4. These domestic policy instruments are thus ill-suited for the 
articulation of an international legal architecture that would govern the use of drones by both 
friendly and more antagonistic parties. 
9 Savage & Schmitt, supra note 5. 
10 See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at arts. 50(1), 51(1) (“The presence within the 
civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not 
deprive the population of its civilian character.”). See also Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-
T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) 
[hereinafter Galić] (“The presence of individual combatants within the population does not change 
its civilian character.”). 
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nature, location, purpose or use, such as an outdoor market or a civilian apartment 
building, then the death zone as a whole should be deemed a protected civilian 
object, regardless of the presence of an otherwise valid military objective, such as 
an enemy militant. 
 
 Proportionality should also be reformulated for drone strikes away from 
active hostilities. Whereas proportionality now requires a focus only on the 
immediate effects of a strike, such a focus is inadequate in the face of a growing 
body of data showing long-term negative effects, such as increased terrorist 
recruitment and violence in the wake of aerial strikes.11 An accurate assessment of 
the military advantage of a strike thus requires us to take into account not simply 
the short-term, but also the long-term effects of a strike. Given that we use lethal 
force in counterterrorism operations with the aim of restoring our peace and 
security, the military advantage of a strike should be measured in terms of its 
contribution to our long-term security. While analysis of the long-term secondary 
effects of a strike may be more demanding than analysis of immediate effects, the 
relevant data is increasingly available and should be welcomed by military 
commanders and political leaders who seek to direct the use of force more 
effectively so that conflicts come to an end rather than proceed indefinitely.  
 
 In conclusion, the Article shows that the proposed reformulations of 
distinction and proportionality for drone strikes away from active hostilities are 
more flexible than the guidelines provided by the PPG, more likely to produce 
effective uses of force with fewer civilian casualties, and thus better serve our 
national security interests and our goals of peace and security.  
 
I. How Drones Put More Civilians at Risk 
 
 Although drones have been defended as a humanitarian advance in 
warfare, a closer look shows that drones put more civilian lives at risk. This is the 
case because drones are used in civilian populated areas where no other weapon 
would be used. Drone defenders have generally overlooked the unique 
circumstances in which drones can be used. They thus incorrectly conclude that 
drones are both interchangeable with other weapons and better than the 
alternatives at sparing lives. However, a direct comparison of civilian casualties 
from drones with civilian casualties from manned aircraft shows that drones are 
not demonstrably better at sparing civilians. To see why the LOAC must be 
reformulated to address the unique risks generated by drones, a closer look at 
drone technology is needed. 
 
                                                
11 See, e.g., C. KOLENDA ET AL., OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., THE STRATEGIC COSTS OF CIVILIAN HARM 
23–25 (2016). See also Jason Lyall, Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the 
Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars, Yale University (Mar. 27, 2015) at 4, 
http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/research_seminar_papers/lyall-airstrikes-
apr2015.pdf (“No matter how precise, airstrikes will kill civilians, shifting support away from the 
counterinsurgent while creating new grievances that fuel insurgent recruitment.”). 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 8 434               
	   A. Why Drones Are Different 
 
 Drones require increased legal scrutiny not because they are remote-
control or risk-free, but because they have led to a breakdown of democratic 
accountability and oversight, while fundamentally changing the options for the 
use of lethal military force. Understanding why drones are different is essential to 
confronting the unique legal challenges they pose and the legal innovations that 
are needed to properly regulate them.  
 
	   1. Drones Enable an Indefinite Covert War 
 
 In contrast to regular military operations, which are generally exposed to 
public scrutiny because they are openly acknowledged by the government, drone 
strikes remain veiled in official government secrecy. Although the more than 600 
drone strikes over the last decade are hardly unknown to the public,12 and the 
program itself has even been openly discussed by top government officials 
including President Obama, all but a handful of drone strikes remain classified.13 
As such, the government places itself in an official position of deniability, cutting 
off real public scrutiny and democratic oversight. For example, in FOIA litigation 
brought by the ACLU, the CIA argued: 
 
[n]otwithstanding widespread reports that drone strikes occur, the 
CIA has never confirmed or denied whether it has any involvement 
or intelligence interest in any of those drone strikes, or whether it 
maintains any records relating to those drone strikes. . . . The Court 
should reject plaintiffs’ attempt to cobble together an official CIA 
acknowledgment by combining together the substance of various 
news reports, unofficial statements, and imprecise statements by 
former CIA Director Panetta and President Obama.14 
 
The government’s ability to maintain a position of deniability flows directly from 
the unique blend of drone technology. Drones pose no risk of American military 
casualties, require no massive troop deployment or fleet movement, and enable 
high precision targeting with a relatively narrow blast radius.  
                                                
12 See The Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s drone strike data, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war. See also Bill Roggio, The Long War 
Journal, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 
2004 – 2017, http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017), and The 
New America Foundation’s Data, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/. 
13 The only exceptions are President Obama’s declassification of a limited number of strikes that 
have killed American citizens, including those against Anwar al-Aulaqi, a strike that killed al-
Aulaqi’s 16-year-old son, and a strike that killed American and Italian journalists, Warren 
Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto. See Peter Baker, Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills 
American and Italian Held by Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), 
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-hostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-
white-house-says.html. See also Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University, supra note 
6. 
14 Brief for Appellee at 43–44, ACLU v. CIA, (No. 11-5320), 2012 WL 1853574 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
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 Some observers argue the drone program is not unique and that the 
government can kill covertly just as easily with Navy SEALs or cruise missiles as 
it can with drones. However, according to the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, there were more than 500 drone strikes outside areas of active 
hostilities during the Obama Administration alone.15 It is altogether unimaginable 
that the administration could have successfully carried out a similar number of 
covert special forces strikes or cruise missile attacks. As the raid on Osama bin 
Laden and a more recent raid in Yemen demonstrate,16 when Navy SEALs or 
other special forces are deployed for a covert operation, inevitable accidents and 
casualties lead to a much higher chance of public scrutiny and eliminate 
deniability. In the case of cruise missiles, a typical Tomahawk cruise missile 
carries a 1,000-pound warhead with a blast radius of several hundred feet, while 
drones typically fire Hellfire missiles with just a 20-pound warhead and a blast 
radius of 50 feet. Cruise missiles are so much more destructive and substantially 
less accurate than a typical drone strike that it is extraordinarily difficult for a 
government that uses them to maintain plausible deniability.17 In contrast to 
special forces strikes and cruise missiles, drones pose no risk of American 
military casualties, offer accurate and limited targeting, and enable far greater 
deniability.  
 
 Unlike any other weapon, drones enable our government to conduct a war 
of indefinite geographic and temporal scope without the American citizenry ever 
being informed of how and when drones are used. Drones thus hover in the 
shadow of government secrecy, just sufficiently under the radar to evade any 
                                                
15 See Office of the Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, Summary of Information Regarding U.S. 
Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/214-reports-publications-
2016/1392-summary-of-information-regarding-u-s-counterterrorism-strikes-outside-areas-of-
active-hostilities; Office of the Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, Summary of 2016 Information Regarding 
United States Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities; 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Summary%20of%202016%20Information%20Regarding%2
0United%20States%20Counterterrorism%20Strikes%20Outside%20Areas%20of%20Active%20
Hostilities.pdf. See also Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, U.S. Reveals Death Toll From Airstrikes 
Outside War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-
reveals-death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.html. 
16 One of the stealth helicopters used in the bin Laden raid crashed and was partially destroyed by 
the Navy SEALs conducting the operation. See Christopher Drew, Attack on Bin Laden Used 
Stealthy Helicopter That Had Been a Secret, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06helicopter.html. On the recent Yemen raid, see 
Eric Schmitt & David Sanger, Raid in Yemen: Risky From the Start and Costly in the End, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/donald-trump-
yemen-commando-raid-questions.html. 
17 While Hellfires claim accuracy within two meters and are developed to hit moving targets, 
cruise missiles can currently only hit stationary targets with a margin of error of ten meters. See 
Thomas Gillespie, Katrina Laygo, Noel Rayo & Erin Garcia, Drone Bombings in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas: Public Remote Sensing Applications for Security Monitoring, 4 J. 
Geographic Information System 136, 139 (2012), 
http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?paperID=18766. See also United States Navy 
Fact File, Tomahawk Cruise Missile, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2 . 
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sustained or widespread scrutiny. Drone technology does not, of course, cause the 
secrecy with which it is put to use. It has, however, enabled unprecedented 
government secrecy and deniability in the use of force. Government deniability 
and a lack of credible public information about drone strikes make legal 
accountability and democratic oversight impossible. 
 
 The secret use of lethal force enabled by drones is in fundamental conflict 
with the oversight and legal accountability required by constitutional separation of 
powers. As Justice Douglas found in the Pentagon Papers case, “[s]ecrecy in 
government is fundamentally anti-democratic . . . . Open debate and discussion of 
public issues are vital to our national health.”18 Justice Stewart specifically 
affirmed the fundamental role of public oversight with respect to “the two related 
areas of national defense and international relations.” He argued that “the only 
effective restraint upon executive policy and power . . . may lie in an enlightened 
citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect 
the values of democratic government.”19 An informed citizenry plays a 
fundamental role in holding the Executive accountable. The covert use of force 
enabled by drones short-circuits the role that the people are supposed to have in 
authorizing military action and leaves two branches of government entirely 
unchecked by the judiciary. As Professor Rosa Brooks argued in her testimony 
before Congress, because “U.S. targeted killings take place under a cloak of 
secrecy, it is impossible for outsiders to evaluate the facts or apply the law to 
specific facts.”20 The secrecy surrounding the drone program makes the 
government’s assertions about it “entirely non-falsifiable.”21 We are thus left 
simply having to trust the government’s reassurances that the program is entirely 
legal without any opportunity for public or judicial scrutiny. As Brooks stated, 
“‘trust us’ is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of law. Indeed, the whole point 
of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not depend solely on 
the good faith and benevolence of government officials.”22 Unless the public has 
access to the facts surrounding military activity there is little hope of effectively 
challenging its lawfulness. Moreover, the reporting of covert activity to members 
of Congress is no substitute for placing the essential facts of military activity in 
                                                
18 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). Cf. 
id. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., concurring), 731 (White, J., concurring). 
19Id. at 727–28 (1971) (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring). Cf. id. at 731 (White, J., 
joined by Stewart, J., concurring) (“Nor, after examining the materials the Government 
characterizes as the most sensitive and destructive, can I deny that revelation of these documents 
will do substantial damage to public interests. Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will 
have that result. But I nevertheless agree that the United States has not satisfied the very heavy 
burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases.”). 
20 Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing Before 
the S. Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 113th Cong., 
15 (Apr. 23, 2013) (statement of Professor Rosa Brooks), 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=cong.  
21 Id. at 11. 
22 Id. at 15. 
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the public domain.23 Members of Congress who receive reports on covert military 
activity are bound to keep that information secret. Judicial precedent also suggests 
that members of Congress would be found to lack standing to challenge the 
legality of covert military activity.24 Drone technology has driven the 
unprecedented covert use of lethal military force and furthered the breakdown of 
democratic accountability in the war against terrorism. 
2. Drones Can Only Be Used in Radically Asymmetric Contexts 
 
 Lack of public information and oversight over lethal drones is problematic 
enough in a democracy. The issue with drones is not, however, simply their 
ability to escape meaningful public assessment. While drone strikes can and 
should be carried out consistently with democratic oversight, drone technology 
can only be deployed in radically asymmetric contexts where civilians and 
combatants will be intermixed. The limited circumstances in which drones can be 
used and the new risk they impose on civilians require us to rethink distinction 
and proportionality. To understand why Predator and Reaper drones are the only 
weapons that could be used for targeted killing in civilian populated areas, we 
have to look more closely at their specific technological characteristics. 
 
 Drone technology combines a paradoxical mixture of futuristic 
surveillance and targeting technology with World War I era aerial sophistication. 
The Predator and Reaper drones currently used in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia are slow-flying, propeller-driven aircraft with relatively low service 
ceilings. With top speeds of just 135 and 200 mph, respectively, they can 
practically hover in place for twenty-four hours at a time, thereby providing 
extremely detailed reconnaissance and enabling high precision targeting.25 The 
very same factors that make the drones so precise, however, also make them easy 
targets for jet fighters and ground-based air defenses.26 The drones used to target 
and kill members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban could pose no serious threat against 
an air force with World War II era sophistication or moderately advanced anti-
aircraft artillery. If those presently targeted by drones possessed the same Stinger 
missiles that the Afghans used effectively against Soviet aircraft in the 1980s, the 
U.S. would have to suspend its use of drones altogether. While no other aircraft 
                                                
23 See, for instance, the reporting requirements imposed by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, 
50 U.S.C. § 3091, and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 102-88 
(1991). 
24 See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F. 3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Cf. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. 
Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987). 
25 See U.S. Air Force MQ-1B Predator Fact Sheet, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator/ and U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Fact Sheet, 
http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper/. 
26 As Micah Zenko has noted, the drones currently in use lack “the speed, stealth, and decoy 
capabilities to protect themselves against even relatively simple air defense systems.” Micah 
Zenko, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, Council Special Report 
No. 65, 7 (Jan. 2013). See also Brian Palmer, Is It Hard to Kill a Drone?, SLATE (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/06/cia_drone_program_is_it_ 
hard_to_shoot_one_down_html. 
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can match drones’ reconnaissance and accuracy, they are so poor at evading 
threats that the Air Force only flies them in “permissive airspace.”27 As U.S. Air 
Force General Norton Schwartz has commented, drones “are not survivable in a 
threat environment.”28 Drones can thus only be effective in radically asymmetric 
contexts with the military advantage firmly on their side. 
 
 In the radically asymmetric context in which drone strikes are feasible, it 
would be obvious suicide for rudimentary fighting forces like ISIL or al-Qaeda to 
overtly distinguish themselves. Militants massing in training camps or on open 
battlefields would be easy targets and quickly swept away by drones and other 
superior military weapons.29 It thus stands to reason that radically outgunned 
militias cannot and will not distinguish themselves from civilian populations. In 
fact, this is what we find in practice. As reports on Libyan forces targeted by 
NATO in 2011 attest, “[a]fter the outbreak of the NATO air war, Qaddafi’s forces 
quickly abandoned their tanks and heavy equipment, as NATO promptly targeted 
them with conventional aircraft, to mingle with civilians in ways that made 
locating them much more difficult.”30 Once Libyan forces abandoned their heavy 
military equipment, drones were then used to target them among the civilian 
population.31 Like the Libyan fighters targeted by NATO, the al-Qaeda and 
associated forces targeted by drones have retreated from “hot battlefields.” 
However, they are generally not alone. They are often surrounded by family, 
including women and children, and in villages surrounded by people going about 
their daily life often with no greater connection to militants than circumstantial 
proximity. As Kenneth Anderson admits, the people targeted by drones are “more 
likely to be surrounded with civilians, whether explicitly as human shields or 
not . . . .”32 Because no other weapon could be used to carry out the strikes 
performed by drones in civilian populated areas, drones place a new and unique 
lethal risk on the civilian population, putting more civilian lives at risk than if 
drones were not deployed. 
 
 Drone technology leads inexorably to the reality that drones will only be 
used against enemies who are virtually indistinguishable from civilians, thus 
                                                
27 U.S. Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz commented that drones “are not survivable in a threat 
environment.” Tom Bowman, Air Force Chief Leaves Legacy In The Sky: Drones, NAT’L PUBLIC 
RADIO (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/10/158521495/air-force-chief-leaves-legacy-
in-the-sky-drones. See also David Axe, Predator Drones Once Shot Back at Jets… But Sucked At 
It, WIRED (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.wired.com/ dangerroom/2012/11/predator-defenseless/. 
28 See Bowman, supra note 28. See also Axe, supra note 28. 
29 This occurred recently when approximately 150 al Shabab fighters in Somalia were assembled 
for what the U.S. military believes was a graduation ceremony. See Helene Cooper, U.S. Strikes in 
Somalia Kill 150 Shabab Fighters, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/world/africa/us-airstrikes-somalia.html. 
30 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Making the Use of Force Too 
Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS 374, 385 (Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012) (“The undefended 
factual assumption of this argument is that targeted killing using drones results in significantly—
vastly—less collateral damage and civilian deaths than other forms of attack.”). 
31 Id. at 385. 
32 Id. at 384. 
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generating complex legal and ethical implications. The ISIL, al-Qaeda, and 
associated forces targeted by drones are no less legal and ethical targets because 
they are radically outgunned by drones. However, the civilians in their vicinity are 
neither legal nor ethical targets and are legally entitled to the strongest 
protections.33 This is particularly the case in areas away from active hostilities 
where attacking forces will deem the obligation to warn civilians prior to attack 
infeasible,34 thus leaving civilians not only without notice of a lethal threat, but 
also defenseless and unable to flee or take cover.  
 
 The unique context of drone use, in which we know that the enemy will 
generally be found among civilians, requires us to rethink the basic jus in bello 
requirements of distinction and proportionality.35 Drone technology is unique in 
this sense. Contrary to other long range remote control weapons such as cruise 
missiles, drones can only be used against an enemy which reason dictates cannot 
and will not distinguish itself from civilian populations. A military that takes 
responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its actions must anticipate an 
unusually difficult task in distinguishing its enemy foe from innocent civilians 
when using drones.36 Although President Obama repeatedly affirmed a 
commitment to limiting civilian casualties,37 targeting the enemy with drones 
places an unprecedented risk on civilians that would not exist without them. 
Before turning to the legal developments that are needed to properly regulate the 
use of lethal military force with drones, the following section examines how 
discussions of drones to date have failed to come to terms with the unique 
technological characteristics of drones, the new threat to civilians they pose, and 
the legal issues that arise as a result. 
 
                                                
33 For example, the principle of distinction holds that “[p]arties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 48. See also id., arts. 44(3), 48, 51(3), 51(5)(a), 52(2), 
57(2)(a)(ii), 57(3). 
34 The obligation of precaution in attack is codified in id., arts. 57, 58. 
35 Cf. Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163, 166 (2011). 
Contrary to Blum, I am not advocating differential or heightened legal obligations for the U.S. 
because of their technological edge. Rather, I am arguing that distinction and proportionality need 
to be rethought because civilians away from active hostilities are routinely placed at an 
unprecedented risk in ways that are not contemplated by the current laws of distinction and 
proportionality. 
36 For examples of U.S. drone strikes that hit and killed unintended targets, see Zaid Ali & Laura 
King, U.S. Drone Strike on Yemen Wedding Party Kills 17, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/13/world/la-fg-wn-yemen-drone-strike-wedding-20131213. 
See also Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, How a U.S. Citizen Came To Be in 
America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-
cross-hairs.html. 
37 See Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University, supra note 6. See also Executive 
Order 13732, supra note 4. 
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B. Drones: Neither New nor Different? 
 
Government and scholarly discussions have obscured the unique 
technological characteristics of drones and the need to reexamine the law 
governing their use. After an abstract review of drones’ risk-free and remote 
control features, most drone defenders quickly conclude that drones are neither 
new nor different and thus present no novel legal challenges. Drone defenders 
thus assume, without a closer examination of drone technology and the reality of 
its use, that drones’ accuracy and supposed ability to distinguish between 
combatants and civilians means that drones must be more humane and spare more 
civilians than other weapons.38 A closer look at the most prominent defenses and 
criticisms of drones shows how the impact of drone technology has been 
underestimated. 
 
 Perhaps the most common strategy of defending drones is to claim that 
drones are not new in any technologically or legally interesting way. Thus, Avery 
Plaw argues:  
 
To begin with, UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] are not so new. 
The first experimental models of UAVs appeared in 1917. . . . 
During all of this time UAVs have been subject to the same legal 
rules and ethical norms that are commonly understood to apply to 
the general use of weapons in combat (e.g., the principles of 
necessity, distinction, proportionality, humanity). So it is not 
obvious why we should expect new principles and concepts to 
arise now.39 
  
Kenneth Anderson goes a step further in arguing that “[m]issiles fired from a 
remotely piloted [drone] present the same legal issues as any other weapons 
system—the law of war categories of necessity, distinction and proportionality in 
targeting.”40 Drone defenders like Plaw and Anderson attempt to head off 
criticisms by pointing out that the supposedly new characteristics most commonly 
associated with drones, for example that they are remote-controlled and risk-free 
for drone operators, are characteristics shared by many other weapons that have 
been in use for decades. They point out that remote-controlled unmanned 
weapons, such as track mines, date back to the First and Second World Wars.41 
They also argue that cruise missiles fired from hundreds of miles away and high 
                                                
38 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 30, at 382 (“The undefended factual assumption of this 
argument is that targeted killing using drones results in significantly—vastly—less collateral 
damage and civilian deaths than other forms of attack.”). 
39 Asa Kasher & Avery Plaw, Distinguishing Drones: An Exchange, in KILLING BY REMOTE 
CONTROL 47, 48–49 (Bradley J. Strawser ed., 2013). 
40 Anderson, supra note 30, at 380. 
41 MILITARY HISTORY NOW, WAR BY REMOTE CONTROL — 2,500 YEARS OF UNMANNED 
VEHICLES, http://militaryhistorynow.com/2012/09/09/war-by-remote-control-2500-years-of-
unmanned-vehicles/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
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altitude bombers deployed well above the enemy’s air defenses are just as risk-
free as drones. Since remote controlled and risk-free weapons have long been part 
of war, defenders conclude that drones cannot raise any novel legal or ethical 
questions, at least not ones that stem from the technology’s intrinsic 
characteristics. 
 
 By focusing on the superficial remote-control and risk-free attributes of 
drones rather than the unique context in which drone technology can be deployed, 
drone defenders erroneously conclude that drones are interchangeable with other 
weapons such as cruise missiles, smart bombs, or even a special forces strike. 
Thus, in commenting on targeted killing carried out by drones, Bradley Strawser 
argues that the same killing “could be carried out by other kinds of weapon 
platforms or even soldiers on the ground with any weapon.”42 This 
“interchangeability thesis,” as I will call it, presents the use of drones as one 
choice among other equally viable alternatives. 
 
 The interchangeability thesis allows drone defenders to compare drones to 
other weapons and argue that drones compare favorably in the most legally, 
ethically, and politically relevant categories. Since drones are more accurate than 
cruise missiles and smart bombs,43 they are thought to enable more precise 
distinction between enemies and civilians.44 Because drones are supposed to 
enable more precise distinction between enemies and civilians, they are thought to 
lower the risk of disproportionate civilian casualties.45 Drone defenders are thus 
led to confidently conclude that “targeted killing using drone technologies 
significantly reduces civilian casualties and civilian harms in comparison to 
alternative means of using force.”46  
 
 Armed with the interchangeability thesis and the assumption that drones 
spare more civilian lives, drone defenders appear to easily parry the most 
frequently rehearsed criticisms of drones. When confronted with the claim that 
drones decrease the human and political costs of war and thus makes states with 
drones more likely to wage war, drone defenders point out the obvious 
speculation of the charge. They quickly add that even if the charge is true, it is not 
necessarily a mark against drones. Putting troops in harm’s way has long been a 
deterrent to military activity. For instance, it has become a truism that the U.S. 
                                                
42 Bradley J. Strawser, Introduction: The Moral Landscape of Unmanned Weapons, in KILLING BY 
REMOTE CONTROL 3, 18 (Bradley J. Strawser ed., 2013). 
43 See Kasher & Plaw, supra note 39, at 59 (“[D]rones are more amenable than other types of 
weaponry to accurate remote control.”). 
44 Zack Beauchamp & Julian Savulescu, Robot Guardians: Teleoperated Combat Vehicles in 
Humanitarian Military Intervention, in KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL 106, 119 (Bradley J. 
Strawser ed., 2013) (“[Drones] are well suited . . . for distinguishing between enemies and 
civilians.”). 
45 See Kasher & Plaw, supra note 39, at 59. 
46 Anderson, supra note 30, at 387. Some have gone further and argued that drones are the ideal 
weapons for humanitarian interventions, because they remove compatriot soldiers from harm’s 
way and are thought to be best at “minimizing civilian casualties.” See, e.g., Beauchamp & 
Savulescu, supra note 44, at 120. 
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failed to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda because of the loss of 
American troops and political repercussions of the “Black Hawk Down” 
experience in Somalia a year earlier.47 Concerns with protecting troops also led to 
a “zero casualty policy” in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, requiring all sorties 
to be flown above 15,000 feet so as to be safely out of reach of enemy air 
defenses. Thus it is at least plausible that drones, which eliminate troop risk, 
would lead a state with drones to resort to military force more readily. However, 
as the examples above suggest, a state’s willingness to resort to military force to 
stop genocide may be a very positive development.48 These considerations enable 
drone defenders to conclude that unless there is evidence that states with drones 
will undertake more unjust wars, lowering the threshold of using military force 
may be a mark for, rather than against, the use of drones. 
 
 When faced with the criticism that riskless drone warfare is inherently 
unjust because the privilege to wage war is ultimately based on the mutual risk of 
opposing soldiers,49 drone defenders again rely on the interchangeability thesis. 
They argue that as long as the use of force is otherwise justified, there is a moral 
imperative to substitute unmanned systems that offer additional troop protection 
when doing so will not sacrifice mission effectiveness or increase anticipated 
civilian casualties.50  
 
 Even when faced with what seems virtually undeniable, that drones have 
contributed to stifling serious public debate about the use of lethal military force, 
drone defenders do not back down.51 Defenders respond that drones are no 
different from cruise missiles or smart bombs that are remote-controlled and fired 
or dropped by combatants far from harm’s way. Thus they argue that if serious 
democratic deliberation about the use of lethal military force has broken down, 
                                                
47 See, e.g., Samantha Power, A PROBLEM FROM HELL 335 (2003) (“Remembering Somalia and 
hearing no American demands for intervention, President Clinton and his advisers knew that the 
military and the political risks of involving the United States in a bloody conflict in central Africa 
were great, yet there were no costs to avoiding Rwanda altogether.”). 
48 See, e.g., Beauchamp & Savulescu, supra note 44, at 124. 
49 See Jeff McMahan, Forward, in KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL xiv (Bradley J. Strawser ed., 
2013). Cf. Paul Kahn, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y QUARTERLY 2 
(2002). 
50 See Strawser, supra note 42, at 19 (All other things being equal, “there is a moral obligation to 
use the remote weapon to avoid putting the operator of that weapon at unnecessary risk.”). 
51 Jeff McMahan argues that because drones take compatriot casualties out of the equation, a state 
will be able to wage war without having to convince citizens to take up arms, risk their lives, or 
accept the sacrifice of their fellow citizens. See McMahan, supra note 50, at xiv. A slightly 
different version of this argument emphasizes the physical remoteness of war fought with remote 
control weapons, suggesting that the very distance from conflict removes the population from the 
horrors of war and thus makes war more abstract and palatable. See P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR 
WAR 322 (2009). Yet another version of this argument emphasizes the extent to which riskless 
warfare will lead to less serious public deliberation over the decision to go to war and thus popular 
indifference to war. See id. at 323. Singer suggests that the decision to go to war may become no 
graver than the decision “to raise the bridge tolls.” Id. Cf. Beauchamp & Savulescu, supra note 44, 
at 122–24. 
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that is a problem for “public participation in democratic deliberation, not 
drones.”52 
 
 Finally, when faced with the criticism that drones remove risk to soldiers 
only to shift it onto civilians, thus violating civilian immunity, drone defenders 
again resort to interchangeability to dodge the attack. They claim that if drones 
really do shift risk from soldiers onto civilians in an unjust way, drones are by no 
means distinct in that regard. The same issue would be raised by cruise missiles, 
smart bombs, and other risk-averting measures like the 15,000-foot service floor 
in NATO’s Kosovo intervention.53 Defenders also point out that these risk averse 
measures have not been deemed to violate the law of armed conflict and are, in 
any case, a vast improvement over the war tactics employed during the Second 
World War.54  
 
 Despite the initial plausibility of some of these arguments, both drone 
critics and defenders miss the mark because they fail to come to terms with the 
unique characteristics of drone technology and the very limited circumstances in 
which it can be used. Without looking more closely at drone technology, it can 
appear as if drones are no different from other remote control weapons and are 
simply one of many interchangeable alternatives equally available to political and 
military leaders. As we have seen, however, the interchangeability thesis and the 
inferences that flow from it are false. Other weapons, such as cruise missiles and 
smart bombs, would not and could not be used in place of drones. Not only do 
such weapons forfeit the deniability that drones enable, they are generally far too 
destructive for use in civilian populated areas. Unlike other weapons technology, 
drones have made the use of lethal military force democratically unaccountable 
and put civilian lives at risk in an unprecedented way. Before turning to the 
challenge of properly regulating lethal drones, the following section responds to 
those who may still believe that drones spare more civilian lives by looking at 
actual data on drone casualties. A direct comparison of civilian death rates from 
drones and manned aircraft demonstrates that drones have not ushered in a new 
age of humane warfare. 
  
 C. Drones Are Not a Humane Alternative to Manned Aircraft 
 
 The central argument in favor of drones is that they spare more civilian 
lives than other weapons. We have already seen that this claim rests on a dubious 
foundation, since most other remote-control weapons, such as cruise missiles or 
smart bombs, could not be substituted for drones because they would be unlawful, 
politically unacceptable, and frequently too inaccurate to hit the intended target.55 
                                                
52 Id. 
53 Kasher & Plaw, supra note 39, at 57. 
54 Anderson, supra note 30, at 383–84. 
55 For an account of how Israel reversed course on the use of heavy munitions in civilian 
populated areas as a result of the legal and political fallout following the targeted killing of Hamas 
leader, Salah Shehadeh, see Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted 
Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 152–54 (2010). 
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One true alternative to drones is manned aircraft. Several commentators have 
argued that drones would do a better job than manned aircraft, especially when it 
comes to civilian casualty prevention.56 When we look at the numbers, however, 
they simply do not demonstrate that drones are better at casualty prevention than 
other aircraft. In fact, at least one of the U.S. military’s own studies shows that 
drones have killed more civilians than manned aircraft in Afghanistan.57 Civilian 
casualty rates from drones are not even demonstrably better than those from the 
manned aircraft used by NATO in Kosovo, a campaign that was criticized for its 
high rate of civilian casualties.58  
 
 Although exact numbers of combatant and civilian casualties, both in 
Kosovo and more recently with drones, are not readily available, we can compare 
the range of available statistics. In Kosovo, the civilian to combatant kill ratio 
ranges from 1:2, at worst, to 1:25, at best.59 Ratios of civilian to enemy military 
deaths by drones in Pakistan from 2004–2011 are nearly within the same range 
with estimates ranging from 1:4 to 1:25.60 The fact that drones have not been 
demonstrably more successful at sparing civilians than the Kosovo campaign is 
all the more striking when we recall that NATO was committed to a “zero 
casualty policy” of riskless warfare. In order to avoid casualties to its own airmen, 
NATO established a 15,000-foot altitude floor for all bombing sorties.61 The 
15,000-foot floor ensured that NATO bombers were out of reach for Yugoslav 
army anti-aircraft artillery. The altitude restriction, while designed to ensure the 
safety of NATO airmen and planes, did “significantly impede[] pilot ability to 
verify their targets.”62 The fact that civilian casualty rates from drones fall into the 
                                                
56 See, e.g., Beauchamp & Savulescu, supra note 44. 
57 See Spencer Ackerman, US drone strikes more deadly to Afghan civilians than manned aircraft 
– adviser, THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/us-
drone-strikes-afghan-civilians. 
58 Steven Erlanger, Rights Group Says NATO Bombing in Yugoslavia Violated Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 8, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/08/world/rights-group-says-nato-bombing-in-
yugoslavia-violated-law.html. 
59 Estimates of the ratio of civilian to enemy military deaths in the Kosovo campaign range from 
1:2 to 1:25, with actual number estimates ranging from 20 to 1,200 civilians killed and 1,000 to 
18,000 combatants killed. Ratios of civilian to enemy military deaths by drones in Pakistan from 
2004–2011 are nearly within the same range with estimates ranging from 1:4 to 1:25. See HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7; see also Steven Lee Myers, Crisis in the Balkans: The Toll; 
Damage to Serb Military Less Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/28/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-the-toll-damage-to-serb-military-
less-than-expected.html. 
60 See Avery Plaw, Counting the Dead: The Proportionality of Predation in Pakistan, in KILLING 
BY REMOTE CONTROL 126, 138–39 (Bradley J. Strawser ed., 2013). 
61 See Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, ¶2, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf [hereinafter NATO Bombing 
Report]. 
62 See Beauchamp & Savulescu, supra note 44, at 113. Cf. NATO Bombing Report, supra note 62, 
at ¶56 (concluding that “there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying above the height which 
can be reached by enemy air defences [sic]”). 
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same range as even manned attacks in which target verification was impeded 
strongly calls into question the assumption that drones spare more civilian lives.63 
 
 Drones’ lack of success at sparing civilians should not be surprising given 
that drones are used to target terrorists in civilian populated areas. What is 
surprising is that many commentators have failed to draw the obvious inference 
from drone use in civilian areas to more civilian casualties. Some have even 
pointed to the recent Libya intervention where drones were used to “hit targets 
that are close to civilians or inside dense urban areas.”64 From the fact that drones 
were used in “dense urban areas,” they infer that drones “are well suited both for 
distinguishing between enemies and civilians and engaging ground troops in ways 
that might risk the lives of pilots in manned aircraft.”65 There are at least two 
undefended and implausible assumptions at work in the leaps to these 
conclusions.  
 
First, the fact that drones were used in dense urban areas does not, by 
itself, show that they are better at distinguishing enemies from civilians. Both the 
facts of the Libyan context and the nature of aerial assaults belie the claim. For 
example, when Qaddafi’s forces were targeted by conventional aircraft, they 
quickly abandoned the battlefield to hide among the civilian population.66 Drones 
were then used to target Qaddafi’s forces among civilians.67 Drones were used, 
however, not because they were able to pick out only Qaddafi’s forces, as if they 
were a kind of science fiction sniper rifle from the sky. Drones were used because 
the more destructive munitions from manned aircraft were deemed a legal and 
political non-starter. Civilians were thus killed alongside combatants who would 
not have been killed without drones. I am willing to assume, for the sake of 
discussion, that the civilian deaths were proportionate and therefore justified. 
However, it would be misleading to present drones as if they were able to cleanly 
discriminate between the enemy and civilians and thereby impose no additional 
death on civilians. 
 
Second, the argument that drones are well suited to engage “ground troops 
in ways that might risk the lives of pilots in manned aircraft” assumes that 
militaries using drones will take more risks with them than with manned aircraft. 
However, the facts do not bear out this assumption either. No Predator or Reaper 
drones were lost in Libya.68 By comparison, at least two manned fighter jets were 
shot down during the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo.69 Since drones are far 
                                                
63 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 30. 
64 Beauchamp & Savulescu, supra note 44, at 120. 
65 Id. at 119–20. 
66 See Anderson, supra note 30, at 385. 
67 See id. 
68 The only drone that was reportedly lost was a Navy helicopter surveillance drone. See David 
Axe, Drone Copter is NATO’s First Combat Casualty in Libya, WIRED (June 21, 2011), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/06/drone-copter-is-natos-first-combat-casualty-in-libya/. 
69 See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-
ACTION REPORT, xxiii (Jan. 31, 2000), http://www.dod.gov/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf. 
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more susceptible to enemy fire than the manned fighter jets used in Kosovo, if the 
U.S. military really were taking additional risks with drones, then we should 
expect far more shoot-downs of drones. As noted earlier, however, drones are 
generally only flown in “permissive” airspace. 
 
 When we look more closely at the facts of drone use and compare them to 
manned aircraft, we find that drones are not even a promising replacement for 
manned aircraft in humanitarian interventions. If we return again to NATO’s 
campaign in Kosovo, one of the strongest arguments among drone defenders is 
that by increasing troop protection, drones would make states more likely to 
conduct humanitarian interventions, while also enabling better protection of 
civilians.70 However, these claims rest on misapprehensions of drone technology 
and capabilities. The Predator or Reaper drones that offer the most accuracy and 
lowest impact targeting could not have carried out the Kosovo bombing campaign 
at all given their limited fire power and increased vulnerability to enemy air 
defenses. While unmanned versions of the aircraft that actually carried out the 
Kosovo bombing campaign could be remotely piloted in a similar mission today, 
the accuracy and lower impact advantages of Predators and Reapers would be 
forfeited. Moreover, there is no expectation that unmanned F-16s and F/A-18 
Hornets would be any less vulnerable to enemy air defenses than manned 
versions. We might expect a marginal increase in acceptable risk with unmanned 
aircraft, but at more than $60 million per aircraft, we should expect that the 
military will continue to avoid flying them where it anticipates a significant 
likelihood of loss.  
 
 The difference provided by drones is neither risklessness nor fewer 
civilian casualties. Rather, the difference is that Predator and Reaper drones have 
changed the alternative space of using lethal military force in civilian populated 
areas. Drones have put lethal force on the table in areas where aerial strikes with 
other weapons would be rejected altogether. Drones have thus made aerial 
assaults in civilian populated areas a policy norm for the first time since World 
War II. The expansion of aerial strikes in civilian areas requires a reexamination 
of the law governing the use of lethal military force.  
 
II. Determining the Right Legal Framework 
 
I don’t think anyone has worked out . . . what to do when soldiers 
and civilians are indistinguishable and the enemy exploits that 
fact.71 
                                                
70 See Beauchamp & Savulescu, supra note 44, at 119–20 (“[Drones] are well suited both for 
distinguishing between enemies and civilians and engaging ground troops in ways that might risk 
the lives of pilots in manned aircraft. These are precisely the two tactical roles in which manned 
aircraft were ineffectively (from the standpoint of civilian protection) deployed in Kosovo and 
other interventions.”). 
71 Anonymous U.S. Army colonel and military ethicist at West Point, cited in David Luban, Risk 
Taking and Force Protection, Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-
72, 19 (2011). 
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 The innovation of drone strikes in civilian populated areas away from 
active hostilities requires us not only to rethink the specific rules governing the 
use of lethal force, but also to determine what legal framework properly governs 
the use of lethal force with drones. As suggested by the Obama Administration’s 
Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), drone strikes away from active hostilities do 
not fit cleanly within either the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or the law 
enforcement paradigm. Although the above discussion has presumed a LOAC 
framework, many believe that a law enforcement framework should govern lethal 
military force away from active hostilities.72 Others have argued that a mixed law 
enforcement and LOAC framework properly applies.73 The United States, for its 
part, has insisted that its use of drones away from active hostilities is governed by 
the LOAC.74 More specifically, the official position of the U.S. is that it is in a 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated forces.75 Despite the official U.S. position, the redacted PPG made 
public by the Obama administration appears to draw some law enforcement 
principles into its rules for strikes outside combat areas. Though the PPG is non-
binding policy, it suggests that the Obama administration recognized the unique 
risks in using drones away from active hostilities.  
 
The main problem with the approach taken by the Obama Administration, 
however, is that neither the law enforcement nor the LOAC framework is an 
adequate basis for regulating drones. A law enforcement framework is simply not 
compatible with the standing shoot-to-kill orders typical of drone strikes. While a 
LOAC framework is thus required by default, the LOAC was not developed for 
the use of lethal military force in areas away from active combat. As a result, 
distinction and proportionality need to be reformulated specifically for the use of 
force outside active combat areas. In addition to filling a lacuna in the law 
governing lethal military force, articulating and affirming the legal obligations 
that govern the use of force in non-combat areas is also a superior alternative to 
mere policy guidance that may not only be suspended by the current U.S. 
                                                
72 See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Judge Bates’s Infernal Machine, 159 U. PA. L.REV. 175, 183 (2011) 
(“International humanitarian law thus does not govern [targeted killing away from active 
hostilities] . . . the international human rights law standard applies.”). 
73 See Blum & Heymann, supra note 55, at 164 (“[T]he legitimate contours of the use of targeted 
killing . . . fit both a more constrained war paradigm and a more lax law enforcement paradigm . . . 
.”). 
74 See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security & 
Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Remarks 
at the Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 30, 2012); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Administration and International Law, 
Remarks at Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 2010). 
75 There is some suggestion that, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006), which found that the U.S. was in a NIAC with al-Qaeda, see id. at 631, the 
Obama Administration applied the law governing international armed conflicts (IAC) to its 
conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. See John Bellinger, Obama’s 
Announcements on International Law, LAWFARE (Mar. 8, 2011), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/obamas-announcements-international-law. 
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administration, but rejected by other nations altogether.76 Articulating and 
affirming appropriate legal obligations for the unique context of drone strikes 
away from active hostilities would enable the U.S. to take the lead in constructing 
the legal architecture to regulate drones for the future, something that cannot be 
achieved by policy guidance alone. An examination of the requirements imposed 
by the PPG will demonstrate why the LOAC needs to be reformulated for drone 
strikes outside active combat areas. 
 
 The PPG sets out one general and five specific requirements for the use of 
lethal force outside areas of active hostilities. The general requirement holds that 
 
the United States will use lethal force only against a target that 
poses a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons. It is simply 
not the case that all terrorists pose a continuing, imminent threat to 
U.S. persons; if a terrorist does not pose such a threat, the United 
States will not use lethal force.77 
 
The strained notion of a “continuing, imminent threat” is the government’s 
attempt to cover the two justifications that the U.S. has for using force against 
terrorist threats (the jus ad bellum question).78 The first justification tracks the 
positions that the U.S. is in a NIAC with the terrorists it targets. In a NIAC, the 
non-state actor enemy is targetable based on its conduct, not its status.79 The fact 
that a terrorist poses a continuing threat is sufficient to qualify the terrorist as a 
legitimate military objective in a NIAC.80 The second justification follows from 
                                                
76 See, e.g., Savage & Schmitt, supra note 5. 
77 Fact Sheet, supra note 4. 
78 Id.  
79 See, e.g., Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, Remarks on International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and 
the Counter-ISIL Campaign at the American Society of International Law [hereinafter Remarks on 
International Law], Washington, D.C. (Apr. 1, 2016), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm (“In many cases we are dealing with an enemy 
who does not wear uniforms or otherwise seek to distinguish itself from the civilian population. In 
these circumstances, we look to all available real-time and historical information to determine 
whether a potential target would be a lawful object of attack.”). See also NILS MELZER, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33 (2009) (“[I]n IHL [International Humanitarian Law] 
governing non-international armed conflict, . . . the decisive criterion for individual membership in 
an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group 
involving his or her direct participation in hostilities.”). 
80 See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 79, at 34 (“[I]ndividuals whose continuous function involves the 
preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function.”). Although enemy combatants in a NIAC 
should be identified based on their conduct or “continuous combat function,” id., the D.C. Circuit 
has, in a number of cases, applied a membership test without regard to actual conduct or combat 
function. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Al-Bihani 
attended Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and visited Al Qaeda guesthouses. . . . 
[E]vidence . . . of either of those two facts . . . would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively, 
justify the government's detention of such a non-citizen.”). A membership test based on 
circumstantial association, rather than combat conduct, is more appropriate for the regular armed 
forces of states engaged in an international armed conflict rather than a NIAC. See, e.g., Jennifer 
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the inherent right of self-defense before an imminent threat enshrined in Article 
51 of the UN Charter.81 The U.S. would be able to exercise its right of self-
defense against a target posing an imminent threat even if the U.S. were not 
otherwise in an armed conflict with the group to which the terrorist belongs. 
Because the U.S. assessment of both a “continuing” and an “imminent” threat that 
would justify a military response is significantly more elastic than the 
“immediate” threat required in a law enforcement context, the general condition 
on use of lethal force set out by the PPG falls squarely within the LOAC 
framework.  
 
 In addition to the general requirement, the PPG sets out five specific 
criteria that “must be met” before lethal force may be used: 
 
1) Near certainty that the terrorist target is present; 
2) Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; 
3) An assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation; 
4) An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country 
where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the 
threat to U.S. persons; and 
                                                                                                                                
Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 
“Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1178 (2013) (“Critically, this detention authority 
rests on an individual’s status as a member of (‘part of’) the enemy forces and is based on an 
analogy to the rules of international armed conflict. Under these rules, such status makes the 
individual a legitimate military target as well, assuming the person has not attempted surrender or 
is hors de combat (i.e., a sick, wounded, or detained fighter).”). See also MELZER, supra note 80, 
at 25 (“For the regular armed forces of States, individual membership is generally regulated by 
domestic law and expressed through formal integration into permanent units distinguishable by 
uniforms, insignia, and equipment.”). For an insightful critique of the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on 
circumstantial associational criteria like stays at a guesthouse, see Benjamin Wittes, The 
Significance of Guesthouses and Training, LAWFARE (June 11, 2011), 
www.lawfareblog.com/significance-guesthouses-and-training (“[A] guesthouse stay . . . does not 
even . . . create a presumption of membership, and it should not shift the burden of persuasion to 
the detainee. The court, rather, should treat it only as one probative indicator of a relationship 
between an individual and a group . . . .”). 
81 See UN Charter art. 51. See Koh, supra note 74 (“[T]he United States is in an armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 
attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international 
law.”). What properly qualifies as an “imminent” threat has been a matter of some controversy, at 
least since the “Bush doctrine” defending preemptive or preventive war. There is general 
agreement that the temporal scope of an “imminent” threat is somewhat more elastic than the 
“immediate” threat that would justify lethal force in a law enforcement context. The elasticity of 
the current understanding of imminence is in tension with the classic formulation of the 
imminence standard given by Secretary of State Daniel Webster during the famous Caroline 
incident. There, Webster argued that military self-defense should “be confined to cases in which 
the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.” James Bassett Moore, Destruction of the “Caroline,” 2 DIG. INT’L L. 
409, 412 (1906). 
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5) An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively 
address the threat to U.S. persons.82  
 
Interestingly, only the fourth criterion has a clear source in the LOAC.83 Each of 
the other criteria more clearly derives from law enforcement considerations. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, police may use lethal force only against a suspect 
who poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.84 
Where the possibility of harming innocent bystanders exists, the law enforcement 
framework imposes additional restrictions on the use of force. New York City, for 
instance, imposes the following restrictions on police use of lethal force:  
 
a. Police officers shall not use deadly physical force against 
another person unless they have probable cause to believe that they 
must protect themselves or another person present from imminent 
death or serious physical injury.  
 
b. Police officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so 
will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons.85  
 
Violations of the prohibition against unnecessarily endangering innocent persons 
have been found when police officers “discharge their weapons when an innocent 
person was in close proximity to the suspect,” for example, when an innocent 
person “was held as a human shield in the line of fire,” and a police officer 
nevertheless fired at the suspect, killing the human shield.86 New York courts also 
found that an officer firing at a suspect “into a crowd was outside the realm of 
acceptable police practice.”87 These law enforcement strictures appear to form the 
basis of the second, third, and fifth requirements that the PPG imposes. Drone 
operators should avoid imposing unnecessary risk on civilians and should seek 
alternatives to the use of lethal force if such force will put civilians in harm’s way. 
The first criterion, near certainty that the terrorist target is present, can also be 
                                                
82 Fact Sheet, supra note 4. A sixth criterion, apparently related to target approval procedures 
among Department and Agency deputies, is redacted. See Procedures for Approving Direct Action 
Against Terrorist Targets, supra note 4, at 3. 
83 For a comprehensive discussion of the LOAC foundation of the “unwilling or unable” test, see 
Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial 
Self-Defense, 52 VIR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012). 
84 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to 
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not 
justify the use of deadly force to do so. . . . Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not 
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”). See also Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (“The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial 
and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others . . . . Scott's attempt to terminate the chase 
by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment.”) 
85 Johnson v. City of New York, 942 N.E. 2d 219, 221–22 (N.Y. 2010), quoting New York City 
Police Department Procedure No. 203–12, “Deadly Physical Force.” 
86 Lubecki v. City of New York, 758 N.Y.S. 2d 610, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003). 
87 Rodriguez v. City of New York, 595 N.Y.S. 2d 421, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1993), 
quoting Velez v. City of New York, 556 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1990). 
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interpreted as related to the protection of civilians. It bars strikes where there is a 
reasonable question of whether the intended target is present and thus whether 
civilians, rather than the target, will be killed.88 The PPG thus presents a LOAC 
framework modified by law enforcement considerations for drone strikes outside 
areas of active hostilities. 
 
 There are several reasons why the modified LOAC framework established 
by the PPG is warranted.89 As the Ninth Circuit succinctly stated in Idaho v. 
Horichi, standing shoot-to-kill orders are “wartime rules . . . patently 
unconstitutional for a police action.”90 Although LOAC requirements can always 
be modified by more restrictive rules of engagement, law enforcement rules 
cannot accommodate the standing shoot-to-kill orders operative in drone strikes. 
Moreover, drone strikes away from active hostilities will almost never involve an 
“immediate threat to U.S. persons” of the kind required to warrant lethal force in a 
law enforcement operation.91 The use of lethal force in the absence of an 
immediate threat, and in contexts where civilian casualties are anticipated, would 
always be out of bounds in a law enforcement context. Thus drone strikes could 
only be carried out under a LOAC framework. However, if the Obama 
Administration was correct in restricting the use of military force outside active 
war zones, then the LOAC as it currently stands is also inadequate to govern 
drone strikes. An examination of the legal baselines established by the LOAC will 
show why it must be reformulated to properly regulate the unique uses of lethal 
force made possible by drone technology.  
 
III. The Law of Armed Conflict Baseline 
 
 A close review of the LOAC shows that it is poorly suited to drone strikes 
in areas away from active hostilities. The core LOAC principles of distinction and 
proportionality presume that armed forces can readily distinguish between 
combatants and civilians. They also presume that military objectives and civilian 
                                                
88 There have been several reported cases of civilian casualties in drone strikes where the intended 
target was not present. Perhaps the most well known is the killing of sixteen year old 
Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, an American citizen killed at an outdoor café in Yemen on the basis of 
bad intelligence. The intended target, an Egyptian al-Qaeda operative, was not present. The attack 
killed twelve civilians, including two minors. See Mazzetti et al., supra note 36. 
89 Israel has also opted for a modified LOAC framework for targeted killing. See Blum & 
Heymann, supra note 55, at 159 (“[T]he Israeli Supreme Court sought a middle ground between a 
more aggressive law enforcement paradigm and a tamer wartime paradigm. It chose the latter as 
its point of departure, but then, in consideration of the unique nature of the war on terrorism, 
added limitations and constraints on the government’s war powers so as to remain as loyal as 
possible to the basic principles and values of the Israeli legal system.”). 
90 Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F. 3d 359, 377 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated as moot, 266 F. 3d 979 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
91 That is to say, the situation depicted in Eye in the Sky, where drone operators happen upon a 
group of terrorists who will carry out an attack on civilians if they are not stopped immediately, is 
the stuff of good thriller fiction, not reality. Cf. Daskal, supra note 80, at 1219 (“[C]ontrary to oft-
repeated rhetoric about the ticking time bomb, few, if any, capture or kill operations outside a zone 
of active conflict occur in situations of true exigency.”). 
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objects are generally distinct rather than thoroughly intermingled. As for the rules 
themselves, there is a conflict between the black letter law and doctrine of 
distinction, which would seem to bar drone strikes in civilian populated areas, and 
a growing state practice of such targeting. Proportionality, as it is generally 
understood, does not take into account the most important mid- and long-term 
effects of drone strikes to arrive at an accurate assessment of the true military 
advantage of a strike. Finally, precaution in attack, which calls on armed forces to 
warn civilians before an impending attack “if feasible,” will always go unheeded 
in drone strike situations where surprise is essential. Although these basic LOAC 
principles are generally well suited to regulating the use of force in areas of active 
hostilities, the baseline they set for armed conflict generally is simply not 
adequate to the reality of drone strikes. 
 
 Before examining the core rules constituting the LOAC, it is worth noting 
that the question of how to distinguish between combat and non-combat areas has 
been at the center of the U.S. military’s approach to drone strikes. As former State 
Department Legal Adviser, Brian Egan, stated:  
 
The phrase “areas of active hostilities” is not a legal term of art—it 
is a term specific to the PPG. For the purpose of the PPG, the 
determination that a region is an “area of active hostilities” takes 
into account, among other things, the scope and intensity of the 
fighting. The Administration currently considers Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Syria to be “areas of active hostilities,” which means that the 
PPG does not apply to operations in those States.92 
 
Although Egan is correct in stating that “areas of active hostilities” is not a 
standard legal term in the LOAC, the “scope and intensity of the fighting” that 
Egan references have been the central criteria for determining the existence of 
hostilities and distinguishing areas of active combat from non-combat areas.93 The 
zone of combat or active hostilities to which the LOAC applies is typically taken 
to encompass a territorial jurisdiction, such as an entire nation-state in 
international conflicts,94 or the territory held by a party to a non-international 
                                                
92 Brian Egan, Remarks on International Law, supra note 79. In response to questions by New 
York Times reporter Charlie Savage, Egan further indicated that active hostilities extended across 
the border of Afghanistan into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, 
where most CIA drone strikes have taken place. Id.  
93 For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found that 
“protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups” are the 
central criteria of the existence of a non-international armed conflict. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case 
No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić decision]. See also 
Reservation by the United Kingdom to Additional Protocol I, Art. 1(4) and Art. 96(3) (“‘[A]rmed 
conflict’ of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the 
commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.”).  
94 Tadić decision, ¶ 68 (“Although the Geneva Conventions are silent as to the geographical scope 
of international ‘armed conflicts,’ the provisions suggest that at least some of the provisions of the 
Conventions apply to the entire territory of the Parties to the conflict, not just to the vicinity of 
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armed conflict.95 However, for conflicts involving non-state actors who do not 
control territory, such as al-Qaeda, a different approach is needed. The functional 
criteria for the existence of a NIAC established by international courts—namely,  
“protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed 
groups”96—are the best criteria for distinguishing combat and non-combat areas.97 
This Article, therefore, uses “active hostilities,” “combat areas,” and similar terms 
to refer only to areas where there have been actual protracted exchanges of fire.98 
Determining where to set the boundary of active hostilities should not require 
more information than sophisticated militaries already possess. Those familiar 
with conflicts know that sometimes conflict is spread nearly throughout entire 
regions, while at other times it can be confined to single neighborhoods, or even 
particular streets. Areas where frequent exchanges of fire are taking place, or have 
taken place in the recent past, are areas of active combat. Areas where there is no 
exchange of fire, and no recent protracted exchange of fire, are outside active 
combat. A review of the core principles of the LOAC will show why distinction 
and proportionality need to be reformulated for drone strikes outside areas of 
active combat. 
 
 The fundamental rules constituting the LOAC are necessity, distinction, 
proportionality, and humanity. An additional rule, precaution in attack, is now 
                                                                                                                                
actual hostilities. Certainly, some of the provisions are clearly bound up with the hostilities and the 
geographical scope of those provisions should be so limited. . . . Geneva Convention IV protects 
civilians anywhere in the territory of the Parties.”). 
95 Tadić decision, ¶ 70 (the law of armed conflict applies, “in the case of internal conflicts [i.e. 
non-international armed conflicts], [to] the whole territory under the control of a party”). 
96 Id. at ¶ 70. See also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 619 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
97 My emphasis on actual exchanges of fire avoids the finding of a zone of active combat where, 
for example, one side bombards a defenseless enemy. It also prevents one side from unilaterally 
creating a zone of active combat simply by choosing to engage in such bombardment. Cf. Laurie 
Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding 
the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 37 (2010) (“Areas where the 
state uses military force, particularly multiple facets of military power, on a regular or recurring 
basis, should fall within the zone of combat. In contrast, those areas where the state chooses 
diplomatic or law enforcement measures, or relies on such efforts by another state, do not 
demonstrate the characteristics of the battlefield.”). 
98 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004) (“An assertion that one resided in a 
country in which combat operations are taking place is not a concession that one was ‘captured in 
a zone of active combat’ operations in a foreign theater of war.”). For a thorough review of the 
distinction between combat and non-combat areas in U.S. case law, international treaties, and 
international jurisprudence, see Daskal, supra note 80, at 1193–1208. My approach to the 
distinction between combat and non-combat areas differs from Daskal’s in two important respects. 
First, I do not extend the area of active combat to the entire “administrative area” in which fighting 
is located, but rather confine it simply to those areas where there has actually been frequent and 
protracted exchanges of fire. Cf. id. at 1208 (“If . . . hostilities are concentrated . . . in certain 
regions within a state, then the zone will be geographically limited to those administrative areas or 
provinces in which there is actual fighting.”). Second, I argue for the application of a more 
restrictive LOAC framework in areas outside of active hostilities, rather than imposing 
“procedural and substantive standards” outside of the LOAC altogether. Cf. id. at 1192. 
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also generally accepted as customary international law for both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.99 Necessity requires action in armed conflict to 
be aimed at weakening the military capacity of the enemy.100 Humanity prohibits 
action in war that would cause unnecessary suffering, such as the “infliction of 
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge.”101 While necessity and 
humanity do not raise challenging legal issues, distinction, proportionality, and 
precaution in attack each warrant more extended discussion, particularly in the 
context of drone strikes away from active hostilities. 
  
	   A. Distinction 
 
 The rule of distinction holds that “[p]arties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.”102 Military objectives include enemy combatants, 
civilians directly participating in hostilities, and “objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”103 Among the most 
common military objectives are enemy combatants and weapons installations and 
depots. 
 
 The requirement of directing operations only against military objectives is 
significantly more permissive than it may initially appear. Unlike the law 
enforcement context, where police are barred from subjecting innocent persons to 
foreseeable unnecessary risk, distinction only requires attacking forces to intend 
to strike a military objective, even when they foresee that civilians will be 
harmed. The central restriction on foreseeable civilian harm comes not from 
                                                
99 While the U.S. has recognized the legal obligation of precaution in attack in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts, it is not clear whether it recognizes the legal obligation in 
actions taken in self-defense. State Department Legal Adviser, Brian Egan, explicitly affirmed that 
“the United States regards as customary international law applicable to all parties in a NIAC” that 
“[f]easible precautions must be taken in conducting an attack to reduce the risk of harm to 
civilians, such as, in certain circumstances, warnings to civilians before bombardments.” Brian 
Egan, Remarks on International Law, supra note 79. The ICRC also lists precaution in attack as 
customary international law applicable to NIACs. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, CUSTOMARY 
IHL, Rule 15: Precautions in Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule15 (2005).  
100 See ICRC, Military Necessity, https://casebook.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-
necessity-glossary.htm. Cf. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 2.2 [hereinafter DoD 
LOW Manual] (“Military necessity may be defined as the principle that justifies the use of all 
measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited 
by the law of war.”). 
101 Francis Lieber, General Order No. 100, the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, Article 16 (1863). See also DoD LOW Manual § 2.3 (“Humanity may 
be defined as the principle that forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction 
unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.”). 
102 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 48. 
103 Id. at art. 52(2). 
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distinction but from proportionality, which requires that anticipated civilian harm 
not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from the attack. Thus, at the diplomatic conference where the 
principle of distinction was codified, the U.S. stated that distinction “prohibits 
only such attacks as may be directed against non-military objectives. It does not 
deal with the question of collateral damage caused by attacks directed against 
military objectives.”104 Many other states, including close allies such as the U.K. 
and Israel, have made it clear that distinction prohibits only the intentional or 
deliberate targeting of civilians, not the targeting of military objectives where 
harm to civilian is foreseeable or known.105  
 
 In additional to permitting foreseeable harm to civilians, distinction has 
more recently been interpreted to allow targeting of enemy combatants “wherever 
and whoever they are,”106 “whether on the battlefield or outside of it,”107 and “at 
all times.”108 The recently released U.S. Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual appears to confirm the view that enemy combatants are targetable at all 
places and times by declaring that “objects that contain military objectives are 
military objectives.”109 The Manual specifically defines combatants and civilians 
taking a direct part in hostilities as “persons who are military objectives.”110 It 
also cites the Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual for the proposition that 
“[c]ivilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and buildings are military objectives if they 
contain combatants, military equipment or supplies.”111 These capacious readings 
of the geographical and temporal limits of targeting imply that a single enemy 
combatant remains a valid target even when he or she is among a civilian 
                                                
104 UNITED STATES, STATEMENT AT THE CDDH, OFFICIAL RECORDS, VOL. VI, CDDH/SR.41, at 
204 (May 26, 1977). See also similar statements by Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the U.K. See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule1_ sectionb. 
105 ISRAEL, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DECEMBER 2008—18 
JANUARY 2009: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS ¶ 97 (July 29, 2009) (“[The Principle of 
Distinction] addresses only deliberate targeting of civilians, not incidental harm to civilians in the 
course of striking at legitimate military objectives.”). 
106 UNITED KINGDOM, HOUSE OF LORDS, STATEMENT BY THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, Hansard, Vol. 653, Debates, col. 600 (Oct. 13, 2003). 
107 ISRAEL, LAWS OF WAR IN THE BATTLEFIELD, MANUAL, MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL 
HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY SCHOOL 42 (1998) 
108 Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government 
to the Minor Interpellation by Members Jerzy Montag, Hans-Christian Ströbele, Omit Nouripour, 
further Members and the Parliamentary Group BÜNDIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-Drs. 17/3916, 
Nov. 23, 2010, at 6 (“[M]embers of the opposing armed forces (combatants) in international 
armed conflict and, in non-international armed conflict, members of organized armed groups 
exercising a continuous combat function may be lawfully targeted at all times as enemy fighters 
under international humanitarian law, including with the use of lethal force.”). 
109 DoD LOW Manual, supra note 100, at 5.7.4.2. 
110 Id. at 5.7.2. 
111 Id. at 5.7.4.2, n.149 (citing Canada, Department of National Defence, Joint Doctrine Manual B-
GJ-005-104/FP-021, Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (Aug. 13, 
2001)). 
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population or in a civilian location, such as a home,112 marketplace,113 or café.114 
These permissive interpretations of distinction are increasingly confirmed by state 
practice, especially the practice of targeted killing away from active hostilities.115 
Although the increased practice of targeted killing with drones would seem to 
confirm a reading of distinction that permitted aerial assaults on combatants 
whether on the battlefield or outside of it, the black letter law of armed conflict, 
legal doctrine, and the development of distinction each call into question the 
legitimacy of the more recent state practice. 
 
 The First Additional Protocol (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions contains 
the first modern codification of the principle of distinction. There, in its definition 
of civilians and the civilian population, article 50(3) specifically states that “[t]he 
presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the 
definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.” 
Article 51(1) goes on to state that “[t]he civilian population and individual 
civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations.” Article 51(2) states “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” Taken together, these rules 
clearly state that a civilian population in which there are a small number of enemy 
combatants retains its protected status as a civilian population and may not be 
subject to attack. Following the widely accepted black letter law of armed conflict 
as articulated in AP I,116 drones strikes against a single enemy combatant or 
terrorist within a civilian population should be understood to be violation of 
distinction.  
 
 Judicial doctrine confirms the view that “[t]he presence of individual 
combatants within the population does not change its civilian character.”117 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) favorably cites 
                                                
112 See Blum & Heymann, supra note 55, at 152–53 (“On the night of July 22, 2002, an Israeli F-
16 aircraft dropped a single one-ton bomb on Shehadeh's house in a residential neighborhood of 
Gaza City, one of the most densely populated areas on the globe. As a result, Shehadeh and his 
aide, as well as Shehadeh’s wife, three of his children, and eleven other civilians, most of whom 
were children, were killed. One hundred and fifty people were injured.”). 
113 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Yemen: US Bombs Used in Deadliest Market Strike (April 7, 
2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen-us-bombs-used-deadliest-market-strike 
(Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes on a crowded market in the village of Mastaba in 
northwestern Yemen on March 15, 2016 killed at least 97 civilians, including 25 children. The two 
strikes are thought to have also killed about 10 Houthi fighters.). 
114 See supra note 88. See also Mazzetti et al., supra note 36. 
115 The U.S. and Israel have contributed more than any other countries to the state practice of 
targeted killing away from active hostilities. See Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, CFR 
BACKGROUNDERS (May 23, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627 
116 Additional Protocol I has been ratified by 174 countries. For a list of States Parties to 
Additional Protocol I, see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Treaties and States Parties to Such 
Treaties, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates= 
XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470. 
117 Galić, supra note 10, at ¶ 50. See also Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion 
and Judgment, ¶638 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (“The presence of 
certain non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population.”). 
2017 / Putting Lethal Force on the Table 457 
the International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) Commentary on AP I, 
article 50(3), which states that:  
  
[i]n wartime condition it is inevitable that individuals belonging to 
the category of combatants become intermingled with the civilian 
population, for example, soldiers on leave visiting their families. 
However, provided that these are not regular units with fairly large 
numbers, this does not in any way change the civilian character of 
a population.118  
 
The ICRC Commentary cited by the ICTY suggests that the presumption in favor 
of protected civilian status can only be broken by the presence of a large number 
of enemy combatants. The Commentary’s example of “soldiers on leave visiting 
their families” further suggests that the presumption in favor of protected civilian 
status is even greater in areas away from active hostilities. Nevertheless, some of 
the best known cases of targeted killing, such as Israel’s killing of Salah Shehadeh 
and the mistaken killing of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi by the U.S., are precisely 
cases in which combatants were, or were believed to be,119 intermingled with the 
civilian population. Insofar as drone strikes away from active hostilities aim at 
single or small numbers of enemy combatants or terrorists who are otherwise 
among civilian populations, they run contrary to both the black letter law and 
doctrine of distinction.  
 
 The development of the rule of distinction also supports the conclusion 
that targeting single individuals in an otherwise civilian context violates the rule. 
The baseline expectation for distinction is that most military objectives will 
contain no civilians and that those objects that do contain civilians will be clear 
military objects. This can be inferred from the generally accepted interpretation of 
distinction that the presence of individual civilians in clear military objectives, 
such a warships, munitions factories, or military bases, does not alter the status of 
the objective as a proper military objective.120 Thus the U.S. Navy’s 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states that “[t]he 
presence of civilian workers, such as technical representatives aboard a warship or 
employees in a munitions factory, in or on a military objective, does not alter the 
status of the military objective.”121 Examples such as these abound in military 
manuals. They suggest that the development of distinction is predicated on the 
                                                
118 Galić, supra note 10, at ¶ 50, n.91 (citing Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary to 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, ¶ 1922 (ed. Sandoz et al. 
1987). 
119 See supra note 88.  See also Mazzetti et al., supra note 36. 
120 But see DoD LOW Manual, supra note 100, at 5.7.4.2., note 149. 
121 DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 
8.3.2. (2007). For discussion of the Handbook’s problematic treatment of proportionality, see 
Marty Lederman, Troubling Proportionality and Rule-of-distinction Provisions in the Law of War 
Manual, JUST SEC. (June 27, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/31661/law-war-manual-
distinction-proportionality/. 
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limited anticipated presence of civilians in otherwise clear military objects. This 
expectation helps explain the limited acceptance of civilian casualties as long as 
they are not the intended target and are not excessive. Moreover, this reading of 
distinction is balanced by the rule articulated in Art. 50(3) of AP I, that the 
presence of individual combatants in a civilian population does not alter the 
protected status of the civilian population. The assumptions supporting the law of 
distinction are that, generally, combatants and civilians will be distinct, and that 
civilians will not be found in military objects, and vice versa. While distinction 
can accommodate limited exceptions to the baseline assumptions, when civilians 
and combatants are thoroughly intermingled distinction needs to be rethought to 
accommodate a different set of background conditions.  
 
 An additional reason why permissive interpretations of distinction should 
be rethought for drone strikes away from active hostilities is that the legal 
doctrine interpreting distinction appeals to proximity to active hostilities as a 
factor bearing on the status of the person or object targeted. For instance, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, in its judgment in the Kordić and Čerkez case, stated 
that “members of the armed forces resting in their homes in the area of the 
conflict . . . remain combatants whether or not they are in combat, or for the time 
being armed.”122 Here the proximity to the conflict helps justify the targeting of a 
soldier while at home. The presence of hostilities in civilian areas alters the status 
of an otherwise civilian object. Thus the ICRC Commentary states that “[i]f 
combat is taking place within a city or a town, and there is fighting from house to 
house, which is frequently the case, it is clear that the situation becomes very 
different and that any building sheltering combatants becomes a military 
objective.”123 The presence of general hostilities is a significant, though not 
decisive, indicator in favor of the military status of a person or object. This is 
consistent with the principle suggested by the ICRC Commentary and cited by the 
ICTY in Galić that if a soldier were at her home away from the conflict, the home 
would remain a protected civilian object. Location away from active hostilities 
thus sets a default presumption in favor of civilian status. While closer analysis of 
the circumstances ruling at the time of attack are required to determine the actual 
status of the object in question, the presence or absence of hostilities sets default 
expectations for combatants and civilians alike. 
 
 A final reason why the baseline established by distinction must be 
rethought for drone strikes away from active hostilities is the fact that civilians 
who attempt to defend themselves against a drone attack would thereby lose their 
protected status and themselves become subject to attack. As the ICTY found in 
the Galić case:  
 
The protection from attack afforded to individual civilians by 
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I is suspended when and for such 
                                                
122 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) (emphasis added).  
123 Cited in DoD LOW Manual, supra note 100, at 5.7.4.2, n.150. 
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time as they directly participate in hostilities. . . [I]f a group of 
civilians takes up arms . . . and engages in fighting against the 
enemy belligerent, they may be legitimately attacked by the enemy 
belligerent.”124 
 
While the above rule makes a good deal of sense for civilian participation in areas 
of active hostilities, it is overly restrictive on the right of self-defense away from 
active hostilities. In active conflict areas, it is reasonable to assume that civilians 
who take up arms and directly participate in hostilities are doing so not merely for 
their own individual self-defense, but in order “to support a party to the conflict 
against another.”125 However, in areas where there is no active conflict, taking up 
arms to defend oneself or one’s family from impending attack looks more like a 
personal exercise of self-defense or defense of others. In the law enforcement 
context, where police are barred from unnecessarily endangering innocent 
persons,126 an innocent bystander would be free to resist unlawful force, even 
from a public official, without losing her protected status.127 A civilian who has 
not been warned of an impending attack and who is not on notice of active 
hostilities looks much more like the innocent bystander facing unnecessarily 
endangering force. She has no reason to believe that an incoming attack that will 
kill her or her family is, in fact, lawful. Yet LOAC only maintains the protected 
status of civilians for self-defense against attacks that violate LOAC.128 The fact 
that innocent civilians have no right to defend themselves against attacks for 
which they have received no warning and that take place far from active 
hostilities, implies that they are due more protection than LOAC normally affords 
civilians subject to the harms of war. LOAC, which has developed chiefly for 
areas of active hostilities, needs to be rethought for its application to civilian areas 
away from active combat. 
 
 The black letter law and judicial construction of distinction, the primary 
purpose of which is to “ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects,”129 is geared toward conventional contexts of 
active hostilities. Targeting individual combatants in areas away from active 
hostilities, although directed at what would be a legitimate military objective in a 
conventional context, runs contrary to the purpose of distinction whenever those 
combatants are found in a predominantly civilian context. The black letter law 
                                                
124 Galić, supra note 10, at ¶ 48. 
125 Melzer, supra note 79, at 61. 
126 Johnson v. City of New York, 15 N.Y. 3d 626, 221–22 (N.Y. 2010). 
127 See, e.g., Model Penal Code §3.04, Use of Force in Self-Protection (“[T]he use of force upon 
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately 
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other 
person on the present occasion.”). In the typical self-defense context, only unjust aggressors are 
barred from using force to defend themselves. 
128 Melzer, supra note 79, at 61 (“The causation of harm in individual self-defence or defence of 
others against violence prohibited under IHL lacks belligerent nexus. . . . Therefore, the use of 
necessary and proportionate force in such situations cannot be regarded as direct participation in 
hostilities.”). 
129 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 48. 
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and doctrine of distinction appear to bar the use of lethal military force in such 
contexts altogether.130 The criterion established by the PPG, which requires 
“[n]ear certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed,” also plies 
closer to the demands of black letter LOAC. The black letter law and doctrine, 
however, are in tension with the loss of protected status for civilians acting in 
self-defense, as well as recent state practice and permissive interpretations that 
allow targeting individual combatants in any context, whether on the battlefield or 
off. Distinction needs to be reformulated to address the tensions and shortcomings 
in the LOAC brought to light by drone strikes outside active combat areas. 
  
 B. Proportionality in War 
 
 The rule of proportionality in war is a direct complement to distinction. 
While distinction allows foreseeable, but not intentional, civilian casualties, 
proportionality demands that foreseeable civilian death and injury, and damage to 
civilian objects, not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”131 While the rule of proportionality in war is codified only 
with respect to international armed conflicts, most states, including the U.S., have 
explicitly accepted it as a “fundamental principle” of the law of armed conflict 
and a binding obligation on all military operations.132 Despite its fundamental 
status, many commentators have complained that proportionality asks us to 
compare incommensurables, believing that civilian casualties and military 
advantage have no common denominator.133 However, at least in defensive wars, 
and especially in the context of counterterrorism actions like drone strikes away 
from active hostilities, injury and death caused to civilians can be directly 
compared to the injury and death that is avoided by removing the terrorist threat. 
Moreover, data-driven approaches to the effects of drone strikes on enemy 
operations, and consequent changes to the casualty rates of both soldiers and 
civilian by the attacking force, can make proportionality a concrete tool to carry 
out more effective counterterrorism operations. 
 
 One significant drawback of proportionality, however, is that it asks 
commanders to focus only on the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated. While this formulation has the positive effect of requiring 
commanders to focus on the actual military advantage to be gained, rather than on 
                                                
130 By doing so, the black letter law of distinction appears to treat civilian areas away from active 
hostilities as if they were subject to a law enforcement, rather than a LOAC, framework. In the law 
enforcement context, civilians are generally not subject to foreseeable collateral damage, at least 
not without an overriding necessity defense where imminent danger to others is at stake. 
131 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 51(5)(b). See also id. at arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), 
and 85(3)(b) & (c). 
132 See, e.g., Executive Order 13732, supra note 4 (“As a Nation, we are steadfastly committed to 
complying with our obligations under the law of armed conflict, including those that address the 
protection of civilians, such as the fundamental principles of necessity, humanity, distinction, and 
proportionality.”). 
133 For a thorough discussion of these concerns and arguments that they are ill founded, see Joshua 
Andresen, New Voices: Challenging the Perplexity over Jus in Bello Proportionality, 7 EUR. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 19 (2014). 
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hypothetical or speculative advantage, it has the negative effect of asking 
commanders to focus on short term, rather than long term, gains.134 As we have 
seen in the war on terrorism, and perhaps reflected more broadly by the Israeli 
experience,135 short-term military gains, particularly those predicated on 
conventional military goals of depletion and attrition, may have little or no 
relationship to the goals of ending conflict and establishing peace and security for 
the long term. Thus a drone strike that causes civilian casualties, while 
proportionate in relation to the immediate military advantage, may have long-term 
negative effects. In addition to anecdotal accounts that drone strike have increased 
recruitment for terrorism in places such as Yemen,136 recent empirical studies 
have shown real strategic costs to killing civilians, including increases in 
recruitment for terrorism, increases in violent attacks, increases in popular support 
for terrorist organizations and insurgent groups, and a general detriment to the 
reputation of the attacking force.137 Even when civilian deaths do not result from a 
strike, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects such as houses and livestock, 
as well as the negative response a population may have to the indignity of being 
subject to aerial strikes can all result in long term costs to a force attacking with 
drones.138 Given the damage that civilian harm can do to longer term military 
advantage, proportionality analysis, as it is presently understood and applied, is in 
tension with the need to take into account the negative secondary effects of drone 
strikes in civilian areas. Taking into account these effects is necessary in order to 
assess the true military advantage of drone strikes so that military force can be 
used more effectively. 
 
                                                
134 See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ICRC COMMENTARY TO PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I), June 8, 1977, ¶ 2209, 684 (“The expression 
‘concrete and direct’ was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and 
relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only 
appear in the long term should be disregarded.”). 
135 Another way targeted killing can backfire is “the Hydra effect.” See Blum & Heymann, supra 
note 55, at 165 (“An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will 
sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the rise of more-and more resolute-leaders to 
replace them. . . . Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah's leader in Lebanon, 
in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi.”). 
136 See, e.g., Dennis C. Blair, Drones Alone Are Not the Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), 
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/drones-alone-are-not-the-answer.html. (“[A]s the drone 
campaign wears on, hatred of America is increasing in Pakistan. . . . Our reliance on high-tech 
strikes that pose no risk to our soldiers is bitterly resented in a country that cannot duplicate such 
feats of warfare without cost to its own troops.”). See also Ibrahim Mothana, How Drones Help Al 
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/ 06/14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-
qaeda.html. The U.S. Army similarly notes in their 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual that 
“killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive 
in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, 
and producing cycles of revenge.”), U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY ¶ 
1-128 (2006). 
137 See, e.g., KOLENDA ET AL, supra note 11, at 23–25.  
138 KOLENDA ET AL, supra note 11, at 25 (“Civilian harm was easily exploited by the Taliban. 
Taliban publications, public communications, and propaganda routinely made use of incidents of 
civilian harm to paint U.S. forces as an indiscriminate, anti-Muslim occupation force.”). 
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C. Precaution in Attack 
 
 An additional reason to reformulate the law governing drone strikes in 
areas away from active hostilities stems from the LOAC duty of precaution in 
attack. The duty of precaution in attack, which was first codified in AP I at 
articles 57 and 58, includes a variety of measures designed “to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects” during military operations.139 The ICRC 
includes precaution in attack as a requirement of customary international law in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts and the United States 
accepts precaution in attack as a legal obligation in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.140 The U.S. has also, through Executive Order 
13732, put in place a policy, in “all operations involving the use of force,” to 
“take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the likelihood of 
civilian casualties, such as providing warnings to the civilian population (unless 
the circumstances do not permit).”141  
 
The most significant issue raised by the duty of precaution in attack for 
drone strikes is the duty to warn.142 Although the duty to warn is expressly 
conditioned on the feasibility of the circumstances, it is clear that the duty to warn 
will never be fulfilled in the case of targeted killing away from active hostilities. 
In such circumstances, surprise is of the essence and any warning to the civilian 
population would be a warning to the target, thus compromising the mission. 
While the duty to warn appears to contemplate circumstances in which a warning 
is not feasible, civilian populated areas away from active hostilities are precisely 
the contexts in which a warning, at least from the civilian perspective, is most 
needed. In areas of active hostilities, civilians are on general alert as to the 
dangerousness of the circumstances and can at least contemplate leaving the area 
to shelter themselves and their families elsewhere.143 In areas of active hostilities, 
                                                
139 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(1). The ICTY found in Galić that failure meet the 
precautionary requirements of LOAC are a possible indication of a violation of distinction. Galić, 
supra note 10, ¶142 (“In order to determine whether the attack [was] directed [against civilians], 
the following, inter alia, are to be considered: . . . the extent to which the attacking force may be 
said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary requirement of the laws of 
war.”). 
140 See Brian Egan, Remarks on International Law, supra note 79. See also DEP’T OF THE NAVY, 
THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.3.1 (2007) (“Naval 
commanders must take all reasonable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian 
considerations, to keep civilian casualties and damage to the minimum consistent with mission 
accomplishment and the security of the force.”).  
141 Executive Order 13732, supra note 4. While the U.S. has recognized the legal obligation of 
precaution in attack in both international and non-international armed conflicts, it is not clear 
whether it recognizes the legal obligation in actions taken in self-defense. 
142 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 57(2)(c) (“[E]ffective advance warning shall be 
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.”). 
143 This is all too often an abstract possibility for much of the civilian population who lacks the 
physical or financial ability to flee their homes. Cf. Daskal, supra note 80, at 1195 (“Those who 
remain within the conflict zone have implicitly accepted some risk, albeit not voluntarily in most 
cases. They can, at least in theory, take steps to protect themselves and minimize the likelihood of 
being caught in the crossfire . . . .”). 
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a specific notice prior to attack works in tandem with the general notice of danger 
given by the ongoing hostilities themselves. By contrast, in areas away from 
active hostilities, civilians have no prior notice that they may be subject to the 
lethal dangers of war. Since a warning prior to a drone strike will always be 
infeasible, civilians will also never be warned of a specific strike and are thus 
placed at extraordinary risk.  
 
 The rules of engagement like those set out in the PPG, which require near 
certainty of no civilian casualties, are a sensible recognition of the special dangers 
of drone strikes away from active hostilities. The unique circumstances of drone 
strikes away from active hostilities, and the unique threat they place on civilians, 
both speak for altering the LOAC baseline to protect civilians where the present 
rules would fail. Given the impracticality of warning civilians in these contexts, 
tighter restrictions on targeting and a more restrictive application of 
proportionality are necessary to reestablish the proper balance between the pursuit 
of military ends and respect for civilians.  
 
IV. Reformulating the Law Governing Lethal Force With Drones 
 
 The operating assumptions on which the LOAC principles of distinction 
and proportionality have developed are simply not applicable to drone strikes 
away from active hostilities. LOAC assumes a general separation between 
combatants and civilians, albeit with exceptions. In the case of drone strikes away 
from active combat, however, the exception is the rule. The targeted enemy will 
not only be intermingled with civilians, they will be virtually indistinguishable 
from them. Civilian casualties are not incidental in these circumstances. They are 
essential. As a result, distinction and proportionality should be reformulated for 
such contexts.  
 
 While drones pose a new and unique threat to civilians, they are 
responding to an unprecedented security threat from terrorism. The PPG attempts 
to achieve an appropriate balance between threat and response by modifying the 
LOAC with law enforcement principles for engagements away from active 
hostilities. What the PPG attempts on an ad hoc basis, however, can be better 
achieved by reformulating distinction and proportionality for areas away from 
active hostilities. Reformulating distinction and proportionality is needed both to 
adequately regulate drones and to lay the foundation for an international legal 
architecture for the use of force away from active hostilities. 
 
A. Reformulating Distinction for Areas Away from Active Hostilities 
 
 The rule of distinction currently turns on the intention of the commander 
and the identity of a military objective. On the current understanding, when a 
commander intends to strike a single enemy combatant, distinction is satisfied 
regardless of the foreseeable harm to civilians and civilian objects. A focus solely 
on commander intention and the identity of a single militant ignores the real 
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world circumstances and consequences of drone strikes, especially when strikes 
take place in civilian populated areas away from active hostilities. Neither 
commander intentions nor the identity of a militant can erase the devastation 
brought on civilians engulfed by drone strikes. They also cannot nullify the 
protected status that civilians are supposed to enjoy, even when combatants are 
found among them. Two core LOAC principles point to a better approach: the 
principle established by article 50(3) of AP I, that the presence of combatants 
among civilians does not change civilians’ protected status, and the widely 
accepted principle that the presence of civilians at clear military objectives does 
not alter the military status of the objective. Rather than focusing on commander 
intention, both of these principles focus on the status of people and objects 
occupying a geographic area. Following these principles, I suggest that rather than 
looking solely to commander intentions and the isolated identity of enemy 
combatants, distinction should be grounded in a functional analysis of the 
geographic area that will be destroyed by a strike—the death zone.  
 
 Before coming to the functional analysis itself, it is important to have a 
clear understanding of what constitutes the death zone. Munitions, such as 
missiles or bombs, have a “blast radius” or “casualty radius,” i.e. the area within 
which casualties are expected, sometimes with a certain probability. For ease of 
reference, this Article uses the term “death zone” to refer to the area in which 
death and other serious bodily injuries have a greater than 50 percent probability. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is difficult to get precise open source data on the death 
zones of various munitions. The best open source estimates, from geographical 
surveys and witness accounts, is that the Hellfire missiles fired by Predator and 
Reaper drones are expected to kill everything within a 15 to 20 meter blast 
radius.144 In addition to death, there are a wide range of serious injuries that can 
occur at considerably greater distances, including injury from “incineration, 
shrapnel, . . . the release of powerful blast waves capable of crushing internal 
organs . . . as well as vision and hearing loss.”145 One U.S. government study 
concluded that sound levels from an exploding Hellfire are expected to cause 
permanent or temporary hearing loss in humans at a radius of up to 385 meters 
from the blast site.146 Thus while drone strikes are very good at hitting their 
intended target, they are not sniper rifles. The destruction they sow spreads far 
beyond a single targeted combatant. The precise death zone for any particular 
                                                
144 Thomas Gillespie, Katrina Laygo, Noel Rayo & Erin Garcia, Drone Bombings in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas: Public Remote Sensing Applications for Security Monitoring, 4 J. 
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM 136, 139 (2012), 
http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?paperID=18766. See also INT’L HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC (STANFORD LAW SCHOOL) AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 
CLINIC (N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW), LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY AND TRAUMA TO 
CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES] (Sept. 
2012), https://law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/ 
313671/doc/slspublic/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf. 
145 LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 144, at 56 (internal citations omitted). 
146 R. A. Efroymsona, W. Hargrovea, D. S. Jones, L. L. Pater, and G. W. Suter, The Apache 
Longbow-Hellfire Missile test at Yuma Proving Ground: Ecological Risk Assessment for Missile 
Firing, HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, Vol. 14, No. 5, 898, 898–918 (2008). 
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strike is a function of many factors, including the angle of impact and whether the 
missile is fired at a building or in the open. Perhaps most importantly, the 
Hellfire, like many other missiles today, comes with a variety of warhead options 
that will produce different impacts under different conditions, leading to varying 
death zones.147  Sophisticated militaries like the U.S. armed forces are aware of 
the anticipated death zone with a particular missile and mission conditions and 
they select weapons based on those conditions and the mission objective. For the 
purpose of a functional analysis of the geographic area to be destroyed by a strike, 
the anticipated death zone with a particular missile and mission conditions is the 
relevant area of analysis. 
 
 Once the death zone is identified, a functional analysis for drone strikes 
away from active hostilities would proceed in two steps. Commanders should first 
determine whether there are civilians present in the death zone. This is perhaps 
not as straightforward as it may at first appear. By hypothesis, in cases of targeted 
killing, the commander will believe that an enemy combatant is present. However, 
the commander’s belief will rarely, if ever, be based on positive identification of 
the targeted individual. The commander’s belief will rather be based on some 
combination of human, imagery, and signals intelligence with an inherent level of 
uncertainty. Beyond the actual target, the identity of the other humans in the 
vicinity will likely be murkier still. Even when discrete objects are targeted, such 
as the passenger vehicle in the drone strike on Anwar al-Aulaqi, the identity of the 
full “target set,” i.e. all of the people who will be killed by the strike, is rarely if 
ever known.148 If some positive intelligence on the identity of others in the death 
zone is not available, then following article 50(1) of AP I, “[i]n case of doubt 
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”149 
                                                
147 Defense Industry Daily, US Hellfire Missile Orders, FY 2011-2016, 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/us-hellfire-missile-orders-fy-2011-2014-07019/ (last 
updated Mar. 20, 2017). 
148 For instance, the Los Angeles Times quoted U.S. officials saying they “had no idea” Anwar 
Awlaqi’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman, was present when they fired at an outdoor café on 
October 14, 2011 in Yemen. Ken Dilanian, David S. Cloud, Grieving Awlaki Family Protests 
Yemen Drone Strikes, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26warlogs.html (“American military officials . . . 
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149 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, at art. 50(1); but see DoD LOW Manual, supra note 100, at 
§ 5.5.3.2. (“Under customary international law, no legal presumption of civilian status exists for 
persons or objects.”). Note that the position set forth in the DoD LOW Manual has been called 
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JUST SEC. (May 27, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/31281/legality-striking-isils-oil-facilities-
cash-stockpiles. 
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The default assumption established by article 50(1) is particularly appropriate in 
civilian populated areas away from active hostilities. If no civilians are present 
and a legitimate military objective has been identified, then distinction is satisfied. 
However, once a commander has either positively identified civilians in the death 
zone, or is led to conclude civilians are present because of the lack of evidence 
that those present are combatants, the commander should proceed to the second 
step.  
 
 Once a civilian presence is established positively or by default, the 
commander should then assess whether the death zone by its nature, location, 
purpose or use is substantially a civilian object. We can expect “easy” cases at 
both ends of the spectrum. Civilian houses, markets, eateries, and apartment 
buildings are each substantially civilian objects. By contrast, military bases, 
weapons depots, and barracks are all overwhelmingly military objects. For the 
former cases in which civilians are expected to be killed or seriously injured 
within a substantially civilian object, the functional analysis determines the death 
zone to be a protected civilian object that may not be attacked. This conclusion 
holds even though a legitimate military objective—the enemy combatant—is 
present in the death zone. For the latter cases in which civilians are expected to be 
killed or seriously injured within a clear military object, the functional analysis 
determines the death zone to be an unprotected military objective. This conclusion 
holds even though civilian casualties are expected. This allowance for civilian 
casualties implies the possibility of more civilian casualties than allowed under 
the PPG, thus allowing greater flexibility to pursue real military threats. The 
potential for more civilian casualties is, however, tempered by restricting civilian 
casualties to instances in which the death zone only contains objects that are 
primarily military in their nature, purpose, location or use. The higher bar 
required for military objects, that they be “primarily” rather than merely 
“substantial” military objects, is justified by the increased vulnerability and 
default protected status of civilians in contexts away from active hostilities. 
 
 The more difficult cases are those that fall between clear military and clear 
civilian objects. So-called “dual use” objects that are used by both civilians and 
combatants will require additional analysis or intelligence to support a strike. It is 
worth noting, however, that the most common dual use targets, such as bridges or 
electrical grids, will not be the object of targeted killing. Moreover, where the 
target is, indeed, an object like a bridge, a surprise attack is not needed and 
civilians in the vicinity can be warned prior to the strike.150 Where the target is an 
actual person and the death zone contains an object that is used by both 
combatants and civilians, then an assessment of the function of the object is 
required. Where the death zone contains, for example, an apartment building or 
guest house, a determination must be made of whether it is substantially used by 
civilians. If it is, then the fact that it may also be used by combatants does not 
                                                
150 Though even dual-use objects remain subject to proportionality analysis. For a discussion of a 
recent finding by the ICTY that the bombing of a dual-use bridge violated proportionality, see 
Lederman, supra note 149. 
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alter the fact that it is a substantially civilian object that retains its protected 
status.151 By contrast, if the death zone is primarily an al-Qaeda training camp or 
compound,152 then, despite the fact that it may occasionally be used by civilians 
or have some civilians present, it qualifies as a military object for the purposes of 
distinction and the commander can proceed to the proportionality analysis. 
 
 Although the functional analysis this Article proposes requires 
consideration of factors other than commander intention, it still necessarily 
depends on commander intention to target enemy combatants. The functional 
approach is thus built on top of the fundamental rule of distinction that requires 
targeting of military objectives only. The functional approach simply adds a level 
of analysis to distinction that will potentially bar strikes in areas away from active 
hostilities that the conventional approach would permit. Although the functional 
approach could also be applied in more conventional areas of active hostilities, it 
may prove overly restrictive in such areas or possibly be seen as incentivizing the 
enemy to violate LOAC in order to shield itself from attack. In areas away from 
active hostilities, however, civilians are owed an additional duty of care, as we 
recognize both in the law enforcement context and in the black letter law and 
doctrine of distinction, and as implicitly recognized by the PPG. 
 
B. Reformulating Proportionality for Areas Away from Active Hostilities 
 
 When drone strikes away from active hostilities satisfy the functional 
analysis of distinction, an analysis of proportionality will be required. As the 
ICTY recently demonstrated in the Prlić case, proportionality can and should take 
into account not just the immediate effects such as death or injury to the civilian 
population, but also the longer-term effects wrought by military destruction.153 In 
addition to negative effects on civilians beyond immediate death, injury, and 
damage to property, proportionality should also take into account the strategic 
costs and negative secondary effects of deploying aerial strikes in civilian areas. 
This means that even where civilian casualties may appear proportionate in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage, the longer-term view of 
military advantage may be considerably dimmer if the strike and civilian 
casualties engender increased enemy violence and greater popular support for the 
enemy. These negative secondary effects are more likely in the case of drone 
strikes because they are more likely to be carried out in civilian populated areas. 
Though most recent studies point to the predominance of negative effects from 
                                                
151 The same result would follow for a civilian apartment building containing a weapons cache in 
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152 For an insightful analysis of the probative value of presence at an al-Qaeda training camp or 
guesthouse, see Wittes, supra note 80. 
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drone strikes, there may also be positive secondary effects which should be 
counted as well in assessing proportionality.154 
 
 As with the reformed approach to distinction this Article advocates, a 
reformed approach to proportionality should proceed in two steps. The first step 
involves a traditional assessment of the immediate anticipated effects of the 
proposed strike. These include both the concrete and direct military advantage and 
the harm to civilians and civilian objects. The immediate harm to civilians and 
civilian objects should be relatively straightforward. Given available data on blast 
radii, the harms associated with missile explosions, and a range of human, signals, 
and imagery intelligence of the blast site, it should be feasible to conduct a 
relatively accurate assessment of the number of civilians likely to be killed and 
injured, and the anticipated damage to civilian objects.  
 
 An accurate assessment of the concrete and direct military advantage 
requires greater analysis. Because we are talking about drone strikes away from 
active hostilities, the concrete and direct military advantage should be assessed in 
terms of the value of the target, the likelihood of eliminating the target, and the 
rarity or repeatability of the opportunity to strike the target. In assessing the value 
of the target, more weight should be given to targets whose elimination will more 
significantly disrupt enemy operations and save lives. Since, however, the strikes 
in question are in areas away from active hostilities, the link between a particular 
target, e.g. an al-Qaeda commander, and operational capacity will have to depend 
to a large extent on intelligence data and the ability to predict future operations 
based on past behavior. Where, for example, an al-Qaeda commander has been 
responsible for directing attacks that have killed hundreds of civilians or soldiers 
and intelligence indicates that he is still active in organizing attacks, there is a 
strong indication of a high value target. Where there is further intelligence that the 
commander could not be easily replaced, at least not without disrupting 
operational capacity elsewhere, there would be strong confirmation of the high 
value of the target. By contrast, if the target were a common foot soldier about 
whom there was little or no evidence of involvement in attacks, and who could be 
easily replaced by others, the target would be of very low value. 
 
 Once the value of the target is assessed, it should be modified by the 
anticipated likelihood of success. Perhaps surprisingly, given their highly touted 
accuracy, drones frequently miss their intended target and hit unintended targets. 
For instance, Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American citizen and leader of al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, evaded a drone strike at least once before being killed by 
drones in 2011.155 More tragically, al-Aulaqi’s sixteen-year-old American son, 
Abdulrahman, was killed in another strike in Yemen two weeks later. In the latter 
strike, which targeted an outdoor eatery, two minors and ten adults were killed on 
                                                
154 For reference to possible positive short-term effects of aerial strikes, see Lyall, supra note 11. 
155 Mazzetti et al., supra note 36. 
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the basis of bad intelligence.156 The intended al-Qaeda target was not, in fact, 
present. A realistic commander will thus need to modify the assessed value of the 
target by the likelihood of actually eliminating it in the proposed strike. For 
example, where there is a sixty percent likelihood of success, the value should be 
reduced to sixty percent of the original assessment.  
 
 Finally, the valuation of the target should take into account the relative 
availability of targeting opportunities. Where opportunities are very rare, the 
value of a particular strike will not be reduced by availability considerations. 
Where, however, opportunities are standing or anticipated to arise frequently in 
the future, the advantage of the proposed strike may be reduced. A reduction 
would be in order, for instance, if significant civilian casualties or negative 
secondary effects were likely to result from the strike. It may also be incumbent 
on the commander, following the demands of precaution in attack, to alter the 
timing or location of the strike to avoid civilian casualties and future negative 
repercussions on the military advantage of the strike. 
 
 Once the immediate effects of a proposed strike have been assessed, an 
analysis of the secondary effects of the strike should be conducted, particularly 
those negative secondary effects that drive down the military advantage of the 
strike. Among the secondary effects of a strike that should be considered are its 
tendencies to hasten or forestall peace negotiations,157 result in longer-term 
incapacitation or reinvigoration,158 or result in greater enemy recruitment or 
popular support.159 While analysis of secondary effects may be more complex 
than analysis of immediate effects, the military, the intelligence community, and 
the interagency as a whole have the collection and analytic capacity and could be 
tasked with supplying the analysis to decision makers with command 
responsibility. In fact, after hundreds of drone strikes and fifteen years of war, 
data on the actual long-term effects of drones strikes is already being produced by 
academics and NGOs. This data should be highly desirable for military planners 
who seek to prosecute a more effective war with an end horizon.  
 
 Some have called into question the usefulness of taking into account the 
long-term effects of drone strikes, or claimed that the need to take them into 
account does not arise uniquely with drones. However, they typically 
                                                
156 See id. (“[A] missile apparently intended for an Egyptian Qaeda operative, Ibrahim al-Banna, 
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overestimate the reliability of assessments of military advantage and 
underestimate the unique impact of drone strikes. For example, Bradley Strawser 
questions whether “future costs” could be known with a sufficiently high degree 
of confidence to count in the proportionality calculation.160 This is an empirical 
question, of course, but it is one that we should want to be able to answer. This is 
particularly true with drone strikes away from active hostilities, because the 
benefit we aim to derive will always be at least somewhat speculative as to the 
future harm averted by eliminating a particular terrorist or enemy combatant. 
Unlike the conventional context where depletion and attrition of the enemy 
frequently have immediate positive effects, drone strikes away from active 
hostilities will always be carried out with some intermediate or longer-term 
objective in mind. Insofar as we cannot even choose an appropriate target without 
assessing its intermediate and long term benefit, we should also be concerned to 
assess its intermediate and long-term costs. While the requirement to assess the 
secondary effects of drone strikes may not always be appropriate for a court of 
law to enforce, it should be attractive to both military commanders and political 
leaders who seek to direct more effective uses of force.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The LOAC is currently inadequate to address the expansion of lethal force 
into areas away from active hostilities. The core assumption of the LOAC, that 
civilians and combatants will be generally separate from one another, is not 
realized in areas away from active combat. As a result, both distinction and 
proportionality need to be reformulated for the unique context of drone strikes 
away from active hostilities.  
 
A natural objection to the reformulations of distinction and proportionality 
defended in this Article is that, by going beyond the current LOAC baselines, they 
may prove too restrictive on the use of force. Thus while the PPG has imposed 
restrictions on drone strikes away from active hostilities in ways that go beyond 
my proposals, e.g. by requiring near certainty of zero civilian casualties, the PPG, 
as policy, leaves an escape valve for more permissive use when circumstances 
demand it. The rules proposed here do, however, provide greater flexibility than 
the PPG. The functional analysis of distinction means that the availability of 
drone strikes will depend on the context in which force will be used rather than 
blanket policy demands. While the proposed rules better respect the protected 
status of civilians, they also allow greater engagement of clear military objects, 
even when civilians are present. In addition to the flexibility built into my 
approach, an escape valve for truly extraordinary circumstances could be found in 
the necessity defense.161 However, adequate protections against the over-use of 
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the necessity defense would be needed to ensure against its misuse.162 Finally, the 
approach to distinction and proportionality that I have defended is predicated on 
the view that our military advantage and the protection of civilians are 
complementary rather than opposed. We use force in order to restore our security. 
Given the negative effects that follow on civilian casualties, measures that avoid 
them will increase the military advantage of strikes and better serve our national 
security. The proposed reforms of distinction and proportionality for areas away 
from active combat will enable us to use lethal force more appropriately and with 
clearer recognition of the unique risks drone strikes impose on civilians. As a 
result, we will fight more effectively and with fewer civilian casualties. 
 
 A final objection, posed by Jeremy Waldron, is that there may be 
“considerable risk” in attempting to revise or reformulate LOAC principles 
because new ones may not as readily anchor themselves in the “habit, ethos, and 
discipline” that presently characterize the conduct of war.163 While it is important 
to consider the harm that can be done by attempting to revise a legal architecture 
that has only gained universal acceptance in the last decades, Waldron’s concern 
underestimates the extent to which LOAC operates as a minimum threshold that is 
almost always modified by more restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE). Soldiers 
are thus already accustomed to the need to accommodate different strictures on 
their actions according to the ROE specified for the situation. Moreover, the 
modifications to distinction and proportionality suggested here start with the 
baseline LOAC principles and introduce rules of analysis specifically adapted to 
the unique context of drone strikes away from active hostilities.  
 
Since drones have put lethal force on the table where it would otherwise 
be absent, thereby subjecting civilians to unique harms in areas away from active 
hostilities, it is incumbent upon political and military leaders to reformulate 
appropriate legal requirements for such use. While the PPG has been a step in the 
right direction, the formulation and avowal of durable legal obligations that 
adequately accord with the protected status of civilians, while also ensuring 
flexibility to strike legitimate military objectives, are needed. Although the United 
States has been at the forefront of state practice and policy for the use of force in 
areas away from active hostilities, other states, both friendly and more 
antagonistic, are not far behind.164 Constructing a legal architecture for drones 
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now will ensure that the U.S. maintains its leadership in the formation of 
customary international law that serves both our interests and our values. 
                                                                                                                                
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-drone-proliferation-2-
20160222-story.html. 
